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Since COVID-19 has forced many governments to restrict travel and
impose quarantine requirements, telework has become a way of life. The
shift towards teleworking is raising tax concerns for workers who work for
employers located in another state than where they live. Most source states
where these employers are located could not have taxed income of out-ofstate teleworkers under the pre-pandemic tax rules. However, several
source states have unilaterally extended their sourcing rule on these
teleworkers, resulting in unwarranted risk of double taxation — once by
the residence state and again by the source state. At this time, there is no
uniform guideline by state or federal governments.
Recently, New Hampshire, supported by fourteen other states, asked the
U.S. Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction challenging
Massachusetts’ telecommuting taxes of nonresident teleworkers. Tax
commentators believed this case would be one of the most significant tax
decisions in recent years, but the Supreme Court declined to hear it. New
Jersey also opposes New York’s long-standing telecommuting taxes under
the “convenience of the employer” rule. This Article examines the
constitutional challenges of maintaining pre-pandemic work arrangements
for tax purposes, arguing that a source state’s extraterritorial assertion to
tax nonresident teleworkers’ income likely violates the Dormant Commerce
and Due Process Clauses. Also, this Article finds the Supreme Court’s
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decision not to exercise original jurisdiction dissatisfying in light of the
substantial increase in remote work.
The problem of taxing teleworkers is not temporary because the pandemic
drastically reshaped where and how people work. Recognizing the need for
a uniform long-term solution, this Article argues Congress should enact
federal law to preempt conflicting state law positions and enforce the
primacy of residence-based taxation on teleworkers’ income. This proposal
would reduce the impact various source states’ tax laws have on interstate
commerce, preserve due process, and bolster policy rationales, such as
taxpayers’ choice in where they reside and pay taxes as their social
obligation to the community.
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INTRODUCTION
Sam is an associate attorney at a law firm in Boston, Massachusetts.
Sam lives in New Hampshire and, pre-COVID-19, Sam would commute
to her office in Boston. Since COVID-19 swept the country in early
2020, Sam has been working remotely from her home. When stay-athome orders were issued by the Governors of Massachusetts and New
Hampshire in March of 2020,1 Sam no longer had the option to
commute to her office in Boston but was forced to work from home.
Over time, the shutdown orders have operated like a light switch, on
and off again. Sam chose the stability of working from home with
permission from her law firm; while working from home, Sam relied on
New Hampshire’s infrastructure, including its electricity, internet,
access to local stores through roadways, and other services. When Sam

1 COVID-19
State of Emergency, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/infodetails/covid-19-state-of-emergency (last visited Sept. 10, 2021) [https://perma.cc/
FCQ7-2TZ3]; U.S. Dep’t of State, Notice, New Hampshire “Stay Home” Order (Mar. 29,
2020), www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/2020-03-29-Notice-New-HampshireStay-Home-Order.pdf [https://perma.cc/74CJ-9RXE].

1152

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 55:1149

tested positive for COVID-19 in September 2020, she also depended on
New Hampshire’s ambulance and hospital services.
Now Sam is preparing to file her state tax returns for 2020. Because
she lives in New Hampshire and worked in Massachusetts, both New
Hampshire and Massachusetts can exercise a taxing right over Sam —
the former under residence state taxation, and the latter under source
state taxation. Generally, residence states, like New Hampshire, exercise
the power to tax the personal income of their residents regardless of
where the income is sourced.2 In contrast, source states, like
Massachusetts, impose taxes on nonresidents’ income only for the work
they performed while physically within the source states.3 If a person
earns income from working remotely for a firm in the source state, such
income may only be taxed by the residence state. When an individual is
subject to both resident and source taxation, their income is taxed
twice, also known as double taxation, pitting residence and source
taxation against each other (unless tax credits are offered by the
residence state).
Of the competing taxing rights, which state ought to have the priority
over teleworkers’ incomes? In this example, Sam is a resident of New
Hampshire, worked entirely from her home for more than nine months,
and used public services, “including police and medical services,
taxpayer-supported broadband internet, utilities, roads, and more,”4
offered by New Hampshire. Thus, under the general rule explained
above, New Hampshire, the residence state, should have the priority.
Nevertheless, Massachusetts, the source state, taxes Sam’s salary and has
priority over New Hampshire because it adopted a temporary
emergency regulation declaring that nonresident income received for
services performed outside Massachusetts would still be subject to
Massachusetts’ income tax.
Here, Sam is subject to the risk of double taxation — once by the
residence state, and then a second time by the source state. The latter
2 See WALTER HELLERSTEIN, KIRK J. STARK, JOHN A. SWAIN & JOAN M. YOUNGMAN,
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 379 (11th ed. 2020); John A. Swain
& Walter Hellerstein, State Jurisdiction to Tax “Nowhere” Activity, 33 VA. TAX REV. 209,
212, 221 (2013).
3 See Ruth Mason, Tax Expenditures and Global Labor Mobility, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1540, 1554 (2009). There is an important exception to this rule, called the “convenience
of the employer” rule, adopted by New York, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware,
Nebraska, and Pennsylvania, which will be discussed infra Parts I.B.2, II.B.
4 Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 19, New Hampshire v.
Massachusetts, 141 S. Ct. 1262 (Oct. 19, 2020) (No. 22O154), https://www.governor.
nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt336/files/documents/nh-v-ma-action.pdf [https://perma.cc/
UKC8-SXJP].
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tax would not apply to Sam if she did not earn interstate income from
her remote work. Further, another issue arises if the residence state
offers credits for taxes paid by its residents to other states5 because this
means the residence state foregoes collecting taxes from its residents
despite all the public services it has offered. The result of this double
taxation is a reduction in revenue for the residence state.
Note that Sam’s example would be more accurate by replacing New
Hampshire with another state with a positive tax rate. New Hampshire
may not be a good example to explain the risk of double taxation and
the tax credit issue because New Hampshire has an individual income
tax rate of zero.6 This unique feature also worked against New
Hampshire in the Supreme Court’s decision in New Hampshire v.
Massachusetts,7 discussed below. Having noted this problem, this Article
offers Sam’s case by referring to the conflict between New Hampshire
and Massachusetts as a stylized and intuitive example that shows the
additional layer of taxation by source state that would not have been
imposed on teleworkers on top of the residence taxation. A more
thorough analysis is provided later in this Article.
Now, consider Chris, who has a similar problem with a slightly
different fact pattern. Chris is a software engineer for a technology
company in California’s Silicon Valley. When the company allowed
employees to work remotely beginning in February 2020 due to
COVID-19, Chris moved out of his expensive apartment in the San
Francisco Bay Area and relocated to Salt Lake City, Utah, where his
parents live. Chris rented an apartment in Salt Lake City, changed his
mailing and billing addresses to Utah, selected a local family doctor, and
lived there for more than 183 days in 2020, which is a rule of thumb to
determine Chris’s residence state.8 Does that mean that Utah becomes
the residence state and California the source state, so that California can
5 All states with broad-based personal income taxes provide credit for taxes paid to
other states to mitigate the double taxation issue. See Credit for Taxes Paid to Another
State, 0130 REGSURVEYS 37 (2021).
6 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77:4 (2020). Massachusetts has a minimum income tax
rate of five percent. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 4 (2020).
7 New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, 141 S. Ct. 1262 (2021) (denying motion for
leave to file a bill of complaint). Justices Thomas and Alito would have granted the
motion. Id.
8 The 183-day rule means that if a person spends more than half of the year (183
days) in a single state, then this person will become a tax resident of that state. However,
each state may have various qualifiers to this rule. For example, for federal income tax
purposes in international tax context, the Internal Revenue Code uses a more
complicated formula, including a portion of days from the previous two years as well as
the current year. See infra Part I.C.
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collect tax on Chris’s income only for the days Chris physically worked
in California?
The answer is unclear because the definition of “resident” includes
not only the 183-day rule but also other fuzzier factors, such as the place
where a permanent home is located, the place that is the center of one’s
life, the place where one’s car is registered, where one’s children go to
school, and where one goes to see a family doctor.9 If a person relocates
from one state to another state for a temporary or transitory purpose,
the person may still be a resident of the former state.10 This would
especially be the case if Chris did not change his driver’s license from
California to Utah because of difficulties getting an appointment at the
DMV due to social distancing rules.
Hence, it is possible that California would insist that Chris’s
relocation is merely temporary or transitory due to the COVID-19
pandemic. Thus, California remains Chris’s residence state and can
exercise its taxing right on the entire amount of Chris’s yearly income
as the residence state. If Utah also argues that it is Chris’s residence state
under the 183-day rule, Chris will be double taxed. This would not
occur if Chris were not engaged in cross-border activities. Additionally,
Utah would offer a tax credit for income taxes paid to California because
California is the source state as well. Then, despite the public services
provided to Chris for the majority of 2020, Utah would collect no tax
from Chris because Utah’s income tax rate is lower than California’s.11
In these circumstances, Chris might have to pay a higher tax rate than
his parents who live down the street, even though they all live in Utah
and receive the same public services from Utah. Here, both Utah and
Chris bear a loss with California not paying for Utah’s services while
also taking income from Chris.
These two examples illustrate that the age of telecommuting has
introduced new concerns to the tax concepts of source of income and
residence of taxpayers. Sam’s example demonstrates the ambiguities as
to what it means to earn income “in” a source state, because
9

See infra Part I.A.1.
HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 379-80. A classic example would be college
students, relocating temporarily for educational purposes.
11 Currently, Utah has a flat income tax rate of 4.95 percent while California has a
top marginal individual income tax rate of 12.3 percent. UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-104
(2020); Standard Deductions, Exemption Amounts, and Tax Rates for 2020 Tax Year, CAL.
FRANCHISE TAX BD., https://www.ftb.ca.gov/about-ftb/newsroom/tax-news/november2020/standard-deductions-exemption-amounts-and-tax-rates-for-2020-tax-year.html
[https://perma.cc/6RCG-F7FC]. California is a source state from Utah’s perspective, and
thus Utah may have to offer tax credits for foreign state taxes on out-of-state source
income. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-1003 (2021).
10
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Massachusetts, potentially losing its source state status over
nonresident Sam’s income, attempts to extend its source status. Chris’s
example shows the confusion as to which state ought to be considered
the residence state because California, which could have been switched
from residence to source state, attempts to maintain the status of
residence state.
However, both examples share the same problem — that is, source
states pursue extraterritorial taxing rights by arguing that the work and
residence arrangements before the pandemic should remain the status
quo. This pursuit renders taxpayers’ adjustments to their new work
environments and residence as immaterial. Moreover, these states do
this at the cost of residence states and cross-border taxpayers. This
raises constitutional issues under the Dormant Commerce Clause12 and
the Due Process Clause13 on whether the source state’s assertion of a
taxing right imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce. It also
raises theoretical questions regarding whether a state’s tax nexus on its
constituents may justify the source state’s aggressive approach.
Sam and Chris embraced their new telework arrangements because of
COVID-19. But by all indications, shifts like Sam and Chris’s are not
temporary, but part of a broader and more dramatic reshaping of the
American workforce. However, as illustrated above, the COVID-19
pandemic has influenced many governments to attempt to freeze reality
to the pre-pandemic era by adopting “anti-catastrophe” tax law and
regulatory guidance.14 Most issued guidance relies on methods of
disregarding specific time-frames, considering pre-pandemic practices,
or assessing public health directives and travel restrictions in addressing
the tax consequences of remote workers.15 These temporary responses
treat the changes brought on by the pandemic as force majeure and try
to mold pandemic-era changes into the pre-pandemic status quo as if
the pandemic is only temporary and has not accelerated the shift to a
remote workforce and digital economy.16
12

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see infra Part II.A.4.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see infra Part II.A.1.b.
14 Andres Baez Moreno, Unnecessary and Yet Harmful: Some Critical Remarks to the
OECD Note on the Impact of the COVID-19 Crisis on Tax Treaties, 48 INTERTAX: EUR. TAX
REV. 814, 829 (2020).
15 See, e.g., OECD, UPDATED GUIDANCE ON TAX TREATIES AND THE IMPACT OF THE COVID19 PANDEMIC 3-6 (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/
updated-guidance-on-tax-treaties-and-the-impact-of-the-covid-19-pandemic-df42be07/)
[https://perma.cc/EQJ3-EQRX] (providing examples of COVID-19 guidance issued by
various jurisdictions regarding the creation of permanent establishments by resident and the
possible factors that affect such creation).
16 See id. at 9, 12.
13
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In ignoring the new reality, residence states now bear heavier burdens
to support their residents amid the COVID-19 pandemic, and yet those
states cannot collect their fair share of tax. Holding to the status quo
also disrupts many Americans who find themselves teleworking from
home in one state for an employer in another state and, as a result, are
now subject to the risk of double taxation.
Problems concerning the taxation of income earned by teleworkers
and dual residents are not novel.17 Over the past decade, Americans
have steadily increased telecommuting and working from home.18 Even
without the pandemic, these numbers would likely have continued
increasing, eventually prompting a more precise government response
to the changing workforce. But the pandemic has accelerated the time
frame for needed change. Where before thirty-one percent of workers
teleworked from home at least once a week, suddenly eighty-eight
percent are now doing so.19 These problems will not disappear as the
waves from the pandemic recede. Instead, these problems will remain
even after travel disruptions and worker standardization caused by
COVID-19 dissipates.20

17 Cf. Edward A. Zelinsky, Apportioning State Personal Income Taxes to Eliminate the
Double Taxation of Dual Residents: Thoughts Provoked by the Proposed Minnesota
Snowbird Tax, 15 FL. TAX REV. 533 (2014) (noting that dual residents also face similar
questions of taxation with teleworkers).
18 Compare Census Bureau Report Shows Steady Increase in Home-Based Workers
Since 1999, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Oct. 4, 2012), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/
releases/archives/employment_occupations/cb12-188.html [https://perma.cc/KJ5Z-5YGK],
with Kimberly Mlitz, Remote Work Frequency Before and After COVID-19 in the United
States 2020, STATISTA (Apr. 9, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/1122987/change-inremote-work-trends-after-covid-in-usa/ [https://perma.cc/7LUQ-SVCE] (indicating an
increase in remote work from seven percent to nine percent from 1999 to 2010 from
the Census Bureau and comparing the two sources indicates an increase from nine
percent in 2010 to seventeen percent, telecommuted five days or more per week, in
2020 prior to COVID-19).
19 Michael J. Bologna, Employers Lean on Congress to Solve Work-From-Home Tax
Dilemma, BLOOMBERG TAX (Aug. 25, 2020, 1:46 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/
daily-tax-report-state/employers-lean-on-congress-to-solve-work-from-home-tax-dilemma
[https://perma.cc/5674-YD4U] (indicating that thirty-one percent of workers
telecommuted, or worked from home, between one and five days each week).
20 See Mark Klein, Joseph Endres & Katherine Piazza, Tax Implications of COVID19 Telecommuting and Beyond, CPA J. (July 2021), https://www.cpajournal.com/
2021/07/16/tax-implications-of-covid-19-telecommuting-and-beyond/ [https://perma.cc/
56UX-WEVC] (indicating that “[g]iven the prolonged length of the pandemic and the
adjustment to remote work for both employers and employees, remote work may very
well become a regular part of business operating and hiring models for the foreseeable
future . . .”); infra Part III.A.1.
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New Hampshire’s request for the Supreme Court to exercise its
original jurisdiction demonstrates the need to resolve the issue of taxing
teleworkers.21 The challenge of New Hampshire22 lies at the intersection
of Congress’ commerce powers and a state’s right to tax out-of-state
workers. The core issue in New Hampshire revolves around
Massachusetts’ announcement that the state was changing its tax policy
for tax nonresidents who, prior to COVID-19, were employees engaged
in business in Massachusetts and had stopped commuting to the
commonwealth. Now Massachusetts will treat these nonresidents’
income as Massachusetts’ source income. In response, New Hampshire
filed a Motion to Leave to File Bill of Complaint against Massachusetts,
arguing that Massachusetts’ new rule violates the Dormant Commerce
Clause as enunciated in Complete Auto23 and the Due Process Clause.24
Massachusetts responded that its tax rule does not violate those clauses
and challenged the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over this case
as well as New Hampshire’s standing.25
Various other states — Ohio, Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, New Jersey,
Connecticut, Hawaii, and Iowa — as well as organizations and
individuals filed Amicus Briefs in support of New Hampshire
concerning the motion or the merits.26 On January 25, 2021, the
Supreme Court invited the Acting Solicitor General to file a brief
expressing the views of the United States federal government in this rare

21

See New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, 141 S. Ct. 1262, 1262 (2021).
New Hampshire, 141 S. Ct. 1262.
23 Brief for Plaintiff, Motion For Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 25-30, New
Hampshire, 141 S. Ct. 1262 (Oct. 19, 2020) (No. 22O154) [hereinafter Brief for
Plaintiff]; see also Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)
(providing that courts will “[sustain] a tax against Commerce Clause challenge[s] when
the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly
apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to
the services provided by the State”).
24 Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 23, at 30-32.
25 See infra Part II.A.
26 To be clear, Ohio, Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska,
Oklahoma, Texas, and Utah argue that the Supreme Court should be mandated to
review this case. See Brief for States of Ohio et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting New
Hampshire’s Motion for Leave To File Bill of Complaint at 1, New Hampshire, 141 S. Ct.
1262 (Dec. 21, 2020) (No. 22O154) [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief for States of Ohio
et al.]. The other states argue that not only should the case be reviewed, but that the
case should be decided in New Hampshire’s favor. See Brief for States of New Jersey et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff at 1-3, New Hampshire, 141 S. Ct. 1262 (Dec.
22, 2020) (No. 22O154) [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief for States of New Jersey et al.].
22
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original jurisdiction case.27 The Acting Solicitor General’s responded to
this in the negative.28 On June 28, 2021, the Supreme Court declined to
hear this case.29
This Article offers the following contributions regarding this timely
topic. First, by reviewing the arguments of both residence and source
states, this Article contributes to the discussion by demonstrating the
constitutional problems of maintaining pre-pandemic work
arrangements as the status quo for tax purposes. This Article argues that
Massachusetts’ tax rule emulates New York’s long-standing
“convenience of the employer” rule that has been criticized as an
unconstitutional extraterritorial assertion of taxing right of a source
state. Both New Hampshire and New York’s rule raise the question of
whether a state can tax a nonresident not performing services within
the state but working for a company that resides in that state. This issue
can be framed as one regarding residence versus source taxation and
whether source taxation supersedes a residence state’s taxing power.
This Article argues Massachusetts’ tax rule violates the Dormant
Commerce Clause under the Complete Auto test30 as well as the Due
Process Clause because (1) nonresident teleworkers’ activity lacks
substantial nexus with Massachusetts, (2) the income is not fairly
apportioned between source and residence states, (3) Massachusetts’
tax rule discriminates against multistate teleworkers and burdens
interstate commerce, and (4) it taxes activities not fairly related to the
services provided by Massachusetts.
In addition, because the Supreme Court declined to hear this case as
a matter of original jurisdiction, this Article reviews the relevant cases
and jurisprudence of original jurisdiction and laments the Supreme
Court’s decision in light of the substantial increase in remote work.31
Second, in addition to the constitutional analysis, this Article presents
more fundamental and theoretical problems of the extraterritorial
assertion of the taxing right from source states.32 Such theoretical
analysis may offer insights for the Court and policymakers where it is
easy to digress from the real problem by being overwhelmed from the
technical and doctrinal legal analysis of the facts and laws at issue.
27

See New Hampshire, 141 S. Ct. 1262 (mem.).
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, New Hampshire, 141 S. Ct.
1262 (May 25, 2021) (No. 154) [hereinafter Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae].
29 New Hampshire, 141 S. Ct. 1262 (mem.).
30 See infra Part II.A.1.a.
31 See infra Part II.A.
32 See infra Parts III.B–C.
28
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Instead of governments viewing the rise of teleworkers as a temporary
transition, states need to view this as an accelerated shift into a new era
of teleworkers. This Article addresses the issues of maintaining the preCOVID status quo and encourages a shift to adapt to permanent
changes.33 The importance of physical presence would be diminished
for business entities, while still being important for individuals. This is
perhaps even more meaningful in the digitalized economy where only
natural persons can have physical presence.34 Additionally, the source
states’ aggressive actions violate taxpayer agency and due process while
burdening interstate commerce. Hence, this Article supports residencebased taxation for nonresident teleworkers’ income. Establishing
residence-based taxation could result in increased compliance and is
supported by consent, benefit, and social obligation theories, which are
foundational for any tax policy.35
Third, this Article suggests a long-term solution for taxing
teleworkers based on residence taxation.36 A state’s ability to implement
its own tax policy is within its sovereign right. However, when a state
implements source taxation on teleworkers, it can trigger additional
concerns regarding the sovereignty of other states as seen in New
Hampshire.37 Notably, Congress can create a lasting solution on the
issue of multistate taxation. However, since Congress has not
established a uniform tax policy, the courts have been left to navigate
this murky area that Congress has failed to address. Congress has the
ability and authority to enact legislation to provide a long-term solution
to the current questions surrounding a state’s ability to tax teleworkers,
and this Article presents various justifications for the use of federal
preemption on this issue.38
However, even before any legislative action, this Article rues that the
Supreme Court decided not to hear New Hampshire. It is a rare original
jurisdiction case with a third of states already involved. Many
practitioners and scholars anticipated that New Hampshire would have
been the most important tax case in recent years.39 The Supreme Court
hearing this case would have accomplished two goals. First, the Court’s
33

See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.B.
35 See infra Parts III.B–C.
36 See infra Part IV.A.
37 See infra Part II.A.
38 See infra Part IV.B.
39 Matthew C. Boch, Open Weaver Banks, Lynn A. Gandhi & Dirk Giseburt,
Remarks at the American Bar Association Tax Section Virtual 2021 Midyear Tax
Meeting (Jan. 26, 2021).
34
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decision could clarify the quagmire of current Dormant Commerce
Clause taxation doctrines by providing clear borders for states to
operate within. Second, it would signal Congress to exercise its
authority to regulate commerce between the states.
While teleworking numbers may subside after the COVID-19
pandemic, the teleworking revolution has begun. Work will continue
to grow more remote and be conducted from one’s home. Without clear
guidance, discriminatory double and over-taxation of interstate
teleworkers will also continue to increase. Considering that the
overarching problem involves interstate commerce and multistate
taxation, the Article urges the federal government, Congress, and the
Supreme Court to offer a solution. These efforts will shed light on
another tax problem of teleworking — that is, the taxation of business
entities with cross-border employees in multiple states. The analysis of
this Article offers insights to a broader audience beyond teleworkers
including those reviewing the potential state corporate tax competition
on teleworking businesses.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I overviews the
rules governing the taxation of teleworkers, how states have taxed
teleworkers, and how states have responded to the rise of teleworkers
due to COVID-19 work-from-home orders. Part II discusses the battle
between the residence states and the source states over taxing
teleworkers’ income. This Part examines the constitutionality of
Massachusetts’ new tax in New Hampshire and New York’s convenience
of the employer rule under the Dormant Commerce Clause and Due
Process Clause. Part III explores the recommendation and rationale for
giving primacy to residence taxation over source taxation in the case of
teleworkers and discusses social theories that align with resident
taxation. Part IV presents Congress’s constitutional authority to create
a uniform tax structure that preempts certain state nonresident taxing
laws. The Article then concludes by emphasizing the need for judicial
and legislative action.
I.

RULES FOR TAXING TELEWORKERS

This Part reviews the basic rules already at play for taxing teleworkers
discussing how states determine whether an individual is a “resident”
or not and then distinguishes how teleworkers present unique
challenges versus other types of interstate workers (such as mobile
workers). It finishes by discussing the guidance states have provided
concerning how they will tax teleworkers during the COVID-19
pandemic period.
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A. State Income Tax Rules
States in the United States have the power to exercise both residence
and source-based taxation over individuals.40 If a person is a resident of
a state, the state exercises residence-based taxation, meaning that the
state can tax the personal income of that person, regardless of its
source.41 Conversely, when a nonresident earns income within that state,
the source state may tax the worker subject to Constitutional restraints,
namely the Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause. The source state
can tax the nonresident’s income only for income derived from sources
in the state.42
In short, residence-based taxation applies to residents’ income,
whereas source-based taxation applies to nonresidents’ income. The
preliminary question then is how states determine whether an
individual is a resident or not. This Subpart explains the rules
determining residence and then discusses the difference between
resident and source-based taxation.
1.

Determining Residence

Establishing residence for tax purposes varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.43 In addition, many states employ multiple tests for
determining residency. Some tests are more circumstantial, using factbased determinations, while others use more objective factors.
For the more circumstantial, fact-based determination for residency,
most states define a “resident” for income tax purposes as someone who
is “domiciled” in the state.44 Generally, domicile is defined as the place
an individual considers to be their home. A home is a place to which an

40 See, e.g., Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 52 (1920) (stating “just as a State may
impose general income taxes upon its own citizens and residents whose persons are
subject to its control, it may . . . levy a duty of like character, and not more onerous in
its effect, upon incomes accruing to non-residents from their property or business
within the State, or their occupations carried on therein”).
41 N.Y. ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 313 (1937) (holding that determination
of residency allows a jurisdiction to tax the taxpayer’s income regardless of source); see
also HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 379.
42 See HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 379.
43 Id. at 380; Scott R. Thomas, Domicile in Multistate Personal Income Tax Residency
Matters: Enter the Swamp at Your Own Peril, 39 PACE L. REV. 875, 876 (2019); Lee
Allison, Kathleen Saunders Gregor & Andrew Yarrows, When Down the Hall Becomes
Across State Lines-Part 1 (1), BLOOMBERG TAX (Oct. 23, 2020, 7:56 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-tax-report/when-down-the-hall-becomes-acrossstate-lines-part-1 [https://perma.cc/9TZ6-4LKX].
44 E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 316.027(1)(a)(A) (2021).

1162

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 55:1149

individual intends to return when absent from a state for a period of
time. Many states also provide that a person may only have one domicile
at any given time.45 Once an individual has established a domicile, that
domicile continues until the individual abandons it, acquires a new
domicile, and resides in that new domicile.46 States consider many
factors when making this domicile determination because evaluating an
individual’s intent is a fact-based inquiry.
In addition to the “domicile” test, many states also apply more
objective tests for determining an individual’s residency status. One
common test is the 183-day rule.47 If an individual spends in the
aggregate 183 days or more of the taxable year in a given state, they are
considered residents of that state for income tax purposes.48 Generally,
those days may include whole or part days.49
Other factors are also considered. Some include a subjective factor,
such as whether the presence in the state is for anything other than a
temporary or transitory purpose,50 and where an individual keeps “near
and dear” items.51 Some include more objective factors, such as whether
an individual votes in a state for an election, whether an individual
obtains a driver license in the state, or whether an individual or their
spouse lists an address within the state on a tax return or paper filed
with a court or other governmental entity.52 Under these more
mechanical approaches, if an individual meets these tests they are
treated as a resident for income tax purposes.
This is not an exhaustive list of the rules that states use when
determining residency. Instead, they are a sampling. However an
individual’s residency is established by a state, the residence state can
then tax the entirety of that resident’s income.53
2.

Residence v. Source Taxation

Residence-based taxation is only one way a state may exercise its
taxing power. Relevant to teleworkers is the second form of income tax
45

E.g., OR. ADMIN. R. 150-316.0025(1)(a) (2021).
Id.
47 See Thomas, supra note 43, at 884-85.
48 See GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-1(10)(A)(iii) (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 206.18(1)(a) (2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-136(3)(b)(xiii) (2021).
49 See GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-1(10)(A)(iii).
50 HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 380; see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 18,
§ 17014(b) (2021).
51 N.Y. TAX LAW § 605(b) (2021).
52 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-136(3)(b) (2021).
53 See Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 52 (1920).
46

2021]

Taxing Teleworkers

1163

through source taxation. Many states exercise both residency and
source taxation powers for income tax purposes.54
Residence states may tax the income of their residents regardless of
its source, including income from sources outside of the state. The
justification for the residence tax is that individuals should contribute
to the state they live in since it is that state which provides them with
public services.55 Source taxation is different because it is based on
where an individual’s income is generated rather than where the
individual is domiciled.56 Generally, source taxation for teleworkers
means a state imposes taxes on a nonresidents’ income only for the work
performed while physically within that state.57 Source taxation is
justified partially by the theory that the state providing the opportunity
for an individual to generate income should have the right to tax that
income even if that individual does not live in that state.
Consider Sam’s example, who lives in New Hampshire but
telecommutes for work to Massachusetts where her employer is located.
For Sam, New Hampshire is the residence state since that is where she
lives, and Massachusetts is the source state since Sam derives her
income there. Because Sam is subject to two states’ taxing powers, she
may be subject to the risk of double taxation of the same income — once
under residence and again under source. Indeed, anytime an individual
is subject to the competing rights of source and residence states, double
taxation may occur.
Under the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, double
taxation is not inherently unconstitutional.58 However, to avoid double
taxation, most resident states provide a credit for taxes paid by their
residents to other source states.59 This double taxation problem is
further discussed in the context of teleworkers below.

54

Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 368 (1939).
Maryland v. Wynne, 75 U.S. 542, 582-83 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
56 Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 52 (1920).
57 See, e.g., HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 401 (providing an example that a
nonresident traveling salesman attached to a New York office who spends virtually all
their time in other states would only be taxed in New York for their entire salary).
58 See, e.g., Curry, 307 U.S. at 357 (finding the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution does not bar multiple taxation); see also Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437
U.S. 267, 267-68 (1978) (“[A]n apportionment formula that is necessarily only a rough
approximation of the income properly attributable to the taxing State is not subject to
constitutional attack unless the taxpayer proves that the formula has produced an
income attribution ‘out of all proportion to the business transacted’ within the State.”);
Guar. Tr. Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19, 22-23 (1948).
59 HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 386.
55
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B. Teleworkers
1.

Distinguishing Teleworkers from Mobile Workers

Before addressing double taxation, it is important to note that
teleworkers present different dilemmas under double taxation than
mobile workers. Although both teleworkers and mobile workers are
particularly susceptible to the risk of double taxation, there are key
differences to the risks each face.60
A teleworker is someone who works for an employer in a state they
do not live in and lacks physical presence but earns income from their
employer in that state. The teleworker “commutes” to work through
electronic means. Common examples of teleworkers include web
developers, computer programmers, and software engineers. With the
increase in internet-based technologies, individuals in other professions
are finding it easier to “telecommute” and not work in the confines of
their employer’s state. The growth in teleworking includes academic
tutors, interpreters, and even attorneys during the COVID-19 pandemic
as people work from home.
Mobile workers are different. A mobile worker is someone who
produces income from multiple states because they have a physical
presence in each state during a taxable year. As a result, states can tax a
mobile worker for the days where the mobile worker is physically
present in the state performing work. In essence, a mobile worker’s
income is apportioned according to their physical presence in a given
state.61 Examples of mobile workers include professional athletes,
traveling salespersons, lawyers, and those in the transportation
industry.
Of course, an individual may touch both categories. Nevertheless,
those who purely telework present an interesting dilemma since they
only have a physical presence in their resident state.

60 See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, The Proper State Income Taxation of Remote and
Mobile Workers, COLUM. J. TAX L. (2020), https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.
php/taxlaw/announcement/view/350 [https://perma.cc/8XV6-3443] (providing that
mobile workers’ key issue is taxation by multiple states based on physical presence in
those states, while remote workers’ key issue is the potential claim of an employer’s state
to tax the remote worker’s income despite having no physical presence in the state).
61 A caveat to this statement is that most states consider the mobile worker present
in the state for that day if they spend any amount of time there. So, if a mobile worker
worked in two states in the same day, each state would assert that that day’s income is
“sourced” to their state.
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The Risk of Double Taxation of Teleworkers

In many cases, if teleworkers are considered nonresidents of a source
state, then the source state imposes taxes on that nonresident’s income
only for work performed while physically in the source state.
Contrastingly, residence states exercise their power to tax the personal
income of residents regardless of its source. In theory, teleworkers
should not need to worry about double taxation since they do not have
a physical presence in the source state, disqualifying source taxation of
their income. But as discussed below, teleworkers do find themselves
subject to the risk of double taxation even when they lack physical
contact with the taxing source state.
Note that the term “double taxation” of teleworkers in this Article
targets source taxation (in addition to the residence taxation) that is
imposed on teleworkers despite their lack of physical presence in the
source state. Admittedly, if the residence state does not impose
individual income tax, like New Hampshire, teleworkers may still face
a source taxation problem, but not the double taxation problem, to be
precise. However, the essence of the problem that this Article targets is
the same, regardless of the residence state tax policy is — teleworkers
confront an extra-layer of taxation by source state.62 This Article
suggests readers take the term “double taxation” with a grain of salt in
this context.
Even though many residence states offer credits to teleworkers to
remedy double taxation, such credits do not eliminate the problem
altogether. Most states offer credits only to the amount of income taxes
that their resident would have paid to the resident state if they had
earned their income there rather than abroad. Often, the credits a state
issues are lower than the tax on that income that the residence state
already imposes. Take Alabama as an example. Alabama offers credits
to its residents for taxes paid on income to another jurisdiction, and it
issues a credit for the lesser of one of two ways. Alabama either issues a
credit for (1) the actual income tax paid to another state or (2) the tax
computed on the same taxable income in the other state using Alabama
tax rates.63 As a result, a resident of Alabama with income from another
state will always pay the higher of the two tax rates on their income
from outside Alabama.

62 The only difference is whether teleworkers face double taxation, which should
have been the residence taxation only, or single taxation, which should have been no
taxation at all.
63 ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 810-3-21.01(3) (1999).
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Moreover, not all states that levy income taxes offer credits for
teleworkers working for out-of-state firms. For example, Arizona does
not provide a tax credit for teleworkers’ income taxes assessed by other
states, such as New York, because Arizona does not respect New York
as a source state.64 Tax agreements may indeed exist between some
states for matters of double taxation. For example, reciprocal tax
agreements permit residents of one state to work in another state
without filing nonresident state tax returns in that second state. Arizona
has reciprocity agreements with several states — California, Indiana,
Oregon, and Virginia.65 However, Delaware does not have reciprocal tax
agreements.66 Nor does Missouri. Nor do most states. Besides Arizona,
only fifteen states and the District of Columbia have reciprocity
agreements.67 And those agreements do not cover every relationship
between the states. In addition, some states have rejected such
agreements.68 As a result, teleworkers may be subject to double
taxation.
Not only is teleworking generally being attacked by post-COVID state
mandates, but states are applying other doctrines, such as the
convenience of the employer doctrine, to tax teleworkers. This special
doctrine and its impact on teleworkers are reviewed in more detail in
Part II.B.
While the COVID-19 pandemic did not create double taxation issues
for teleworkers, it has exacerbated them. And in turn, so has the
response to the pandemic from other states. This is because temporary
guidance adopted by states aim to maintain the pre-COVID-19 work
arrangements to determine the source of income and residence of
teleworkers. The states’ guidance in effect emulates the convenience of
the employer doctrine as a way to become the source of income,
exacerbating the double taxation problem of teleworkers. The next

64 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 43-1071(A)(1) (2017) (granting residents an Arizona
income tax credit “only for taxes paid to the other state . . . on income that is derived
from sources within that state”); Edward A. Zelinsky, Coronavirus, Telecommuting, and
the ‘Employer Convenience’ Rule, 95 TAX NOTES STATE 1101, 1102 (2020) [hereinafter
Coronavirus].
65 Withholding Exceptions, ARIZ. DEP’T. OF REVENUE, https://azdor.gov/businessesarizona/withholding-tax/withholding-exceptions (last visited Sept. 10, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/RFW5-T6WN].
66 Tonya Moreno, Reciprocity: States that Don’t Tax Nonresident Workers, BALANCE
(Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.thebalance.com/state-with-reciprocal-agreements-3193329
[https://perma.cc/C7AL-W5QZ].
67 Id.
68 Bologna, supra note 19.
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Subpart surveys the guidance of various states and reveals the resulting
problem.
C. Guidance During COVID-19
When it comes to issuing guidance on taxing teleworkers in response
to the pandemic, states have reacted in varying manners.
1.

The States’ Responses

As of June 2021, many states have not issued guidance regarding
taxing teleworkers during the pandemic. These states include Arizona,
D.C., Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, New Mexico, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia.69
However, some states have issued guidance. One group of states
maintains the location of the source before the pandemic, effectively
allowing extraterritorial taxation on teleworkers’ income by source
state. For example, Alabama states that an employee’s regular place of
work is the state that will get to tax the employee’s income.70 For
teleworkers, this means if they worked in a particular state before the
pandemic, then that state would get to continue taxing the teleworker’s
income. Other states adopting this policy include Georgia, Maine,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and South Carolina.71 In essence, these states seek to
maintain the status quo that existed before the COVID-19 pandemic.
Other states have issued contrary guidance, allowing the primary
taxing power of teleworkers’ residence state. For example, California
issued guidance stating that the state from where an employee
telecommutes is the state that gets to tax the income of that
teleworker.72 Other states treating teleworkers similarly are Colorado,
Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, and

69 HODGSON
RUSS LLP, STATE GUIDANCE RELATED TO COVID-19,
https://www.hodgsonruss.com/assets/htmldocuments/Telecommuting_5.22.20.pdf (last
updated June 9, 2021) [https://perma.cc/E9TB-RTJ6].
70 Id. (indicating Alabama will not consider temporary changes in an employee’s
physical work location due to COVID-19).
71 Id.
72 See generally COVID-19 Frequently Asked Questions for Tax Relief and Assistance,
CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD., https://www.ftb.ca.gov/about-ftb/newsroom/covid-19/helpwith-covid-19.html#Teleworking-and-the-Stay-at-Home-order (last visited Sept. 10,
2021) [https://perma.cc/2EGJ-KJF6] (providing information in a “FAQ” format
regarding tax relief and assistance policies and program taken by California during the
COVID-19 pandemic).
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Wisconsin.73 However, consider Chris’s example who relocated from
California to Utah during the pandemic. Which state is his residence
state? Both California and Utah may insist that they are Chris’s
residence state — California based on Chris’s relocation being
temporary, and Utah based on the 183-day rule.74 Chris would still be
worried about the double taxation issue.
Last, a third group of states have issued their own specific responses.
For example, Illinois issued guidance stating that if a teleworker has
telecommuted from Illinois for more than thirty days, the teleworker’s
income will be subject to Illinois income tax and income tax
withholding.75 Kansas has adopted a mixed policy, providing that an
employee’s regular place of work may continue taxing the employee’s
income between March 13, 2020, to December 31, 2020.76 Thereafter,
the state from where an employee telecommutes will be the one that
gets to tax the teleworker.77 Missouri allows certain employees to be
taxed from where they are telecommuting while for others it allows
them to elect if they want the state where the employee regularly
worked before the pandemic to be able to continue taxing them.78 And
Vermont stated that an employee’s home state will be allowed to tax the
income of a telecommuter.79

73

See HODGSON RUSS LLP, supra note 69.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-136(3)(b)(xiii) (2021); see COVID-19 Frequently Asked
Questions for Tax Relief and Assistance, supra note 72.
75 DAVID HARRIS, ILL. DEP’T OF REVENUE, ILLINOIS WITHHOLDING REQUIREMENTS FOR
OUT-OF-STATE EMPLOYERS WHO EMPLOY ILLINOIS RESIDENTS WORKING FROM HOME DUE TO
COVID-19 VIRUS OUTBREAK 1 (May 2020), https://www2.illinois.gov/rev/research/
publications/bulletins/Documents/2020/FY2020-29.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8R9-2XEC].
76 Kan. Exec. Order No. 21-01 (Jan. 26, 2021).
77 Id.
78 MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 12, § 10-2.019 (2021).
79 Relocated and Remote Workers: Guidance for Employers and Employees, AGENCY OF
ADMIN. DEPT. OF TAXES, https://tax.vermont.gov/coronavirus/working-remotely (last
visited Feb. 18, 2021) [https://perma.cc/LKJ7-244N]; see STATE OF VT. DEPT. OF TAXES,
2021 INCOME TAX WITHHOLDING INSTRUCTIONS, TABLES, AND CHARTS 2 (2021).
74
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Table 1. State Guidance on Teleworkers’ Income80
Guidance on what
state gets to tax
teleworkers’
income
Source state to
maintain the status
quo of source
Residence state

States

Individual
guidance

•

Alabama, Georgia, Maine, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina
California, Colorado, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon,
Wisconsin.

•

•
•
•

•

80
81

Arkansas: Employee’s regular place of
work (employer’s home state) until Dec.
31, 2020. As of Jan. 1, 2021, the state from
where employee is telecommuting.
Connecticut: State from where employee is
telecommuting (i.e., employee’s home
state) and a credit may be allowed for CT
residents for 2020.
Delaware: through May 31, 2020, and for
after June 1, 2020, if employee is not
permitted to work in the office.
Illinois: Illinois gets to tax teleworker if
employee is telecommuting from there for
more than thirty days.
Kansas: State from where employee is
telecommuting (i.e., employee’s home
state) or employee’s regular place of work
(i.e., the employer’s home state) for period
of March 13, 2020, to December 31, 2022.
Michigan: Per informal email from Tax
Policy Division, if a Michigan resident
works remotely for a New York employer
and that state taxes the wages, Michigan
will give the resident a credit against the
tax.81

Table 1 was created by the author, based on HODGSON RUSS LLP, supra note 69.
Id. at 21. This may be considered no guidance.
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•

No guidance

No state income
tax

2.

Missouri: State from where employee is
telecommuting (i.e., employee’s home
state) or, for certain employers, employee’s
regular place of work (i.e., the employer’s
home state) if elected.
• New Jersey: The employer’s home state’s
rules dictate which state gets the tax (i.e.,
NJ employer with nonresident employee
working from home, withholding based on
NJ rule of sourcing to where work is
performed). Pre-pandemic sourcing rule
applies as of October 1, 2021.
• Vermont: Employee’s home state may tax.
Arizona, D.C., Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,
Louisiana, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Utah, Virginia,
West Virginia
Alaska, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington,
Wyoming

A Most Troubling Response

Of the states that have issued guidance, the most problematic is that
of the states who decided to maintain the status quo prior to the
COVID-19 pandemic. Although many of these states’ guidance are
temporary measures, they still extend a source state’s taxing powers
beyond what might be constitutionally allowed. The United States
Supreme Court has held:
[J]ust as a state may impose general income taxes upon its own
citizens and residents whose persons are subject to its control,
it may . . . levy a duty of like character, and not more onerous
in its effect, upon incomes accruing to nonresidents from their
property or business within the state, or their occupations
carried on therein . . . .82
So, a state is limited to taxing a nonresident’s income to only the income
derived from sources within the state.83 Over time, the Supreme Court
82
83

Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 52 (1920).
Id. at 57.

Taxing Teleworkers

2021]

1171

has taken a broad view of what may be “source.” Indeed, the Supreme
Court has ruled:
[a] [S]tate is free to pursue its own fiscal policies,
unembarrassed by the Constitution, if by the practical operation
of a tax the state has exerted its power in relation to
opportunities which it has given, to protection which it has
afforded, to benefits which it has conferred by the fact of being
an orderly, civilized society.84
Still, when it comes to interstate activities, the Supreme Court has
declared “[t]he Commerce Clause forbids the States to levy taxes that
discriminate against interstate commerce or that burden it by subjecting
activities to multiple or unfairly apportioned taxation.”85 As discussed
later in this Article, states seeking to maintain the status quo by
extending source states’ taxation powers may violate the Constitution.
Whatever the constitutionality, allowing states to maintain the status
quo by extending source states’ taxation powers results in two primary
problems. First, by states extending their source taxing power,
residence states cannot collect a fair share of revenue while providing
public services to their residents. Second, this situation exacerbates the
long-standing problem of double taxation on multistate income. These
issues are explored in greater detail in Part II.
II.

THE BATTLE OVER TAXING TELEWORKERS

The problems of the states being unable to collect their fair share of
revenue and its concurrent challenge, the risk of double taxation, are
now manifesting in Supreme Court litigation in New Hampshire.86
Massachusetts seeks to tax New Hampshire residents who once worked
in Massachusetts, but now because of the COVID-19 pandemic, neither
work physically nor live in the commonwealth. New Hampshire has
sued, arguing that the taxation of their residents is unconstitutional for
various reasons. In contrast, Massachusetts argues it is both appropriate
and merely an extension of traditional tax law.
Although the Supreme Court declined to hear this case as a matter of
original jurisdiction, New Hampshire presented important issues in
84

Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
MeadWestvaco Corp. ex rel. Mead Corp. v. Illinois Dep’t of Revenue, 553 U.S. 16,
24 (2008).
86 New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, 141 S. Ct. 1262 (2021) (mem.) (denying
motion for leave to file a bill of complaint). Justices Thomas and Alito would have
granted the motion. Id.
85
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multistate taxation for remote workers. This Part reviews the arguments
presented by both parties and offers constitutional analysis of both
arguments and of maintaining pre-pandemic work arrangements as the
status quo for tax purposes. It also revisits New York’s long-standing
“convenience of the employer” rule, which Massachusetts’ tax rule has
emulated.
A. New Hampshire v. Massachusetts
New Hampshire v. Massachusetts represented the long-awaited (and
inevitable) conflict between teleworkers’ residence and source taxation
in the United States.87 On April 21, 2020, Massachusetts adopted an
emergency tax regulation that applied retroactively to March 10, 2020,
which changed Massachusetts’ tax policy to tax nonresidents who, prior
to COVID-19, were employees engaged in business in Massachusetts
and had changed their residence outside of the commonwealth, being
treated for tax purposes as “source income subject to personal income
tax.”88 Massachusetts then extended the emergency regulation and
adopted it as a final rule. Initially, it was set to expire on the earlier of
December 31, 2020, or 90 days after the Governor ends the state of
emergency.89
In response to Massachusetts’ regulation, New Hampshire Governor
Chris Sununu publicly announced that the regulation is an
unconstitutional attack on New Hampshire’s sovereignty and its
citizens, indicating that New Hampshire would challenge the regulation
with the Supreme Court.90 Shortly after, the New Hampshire Attorney
General filed a Motion for Leave to File a Bill of Complaint with the
Court.
Massachusetts filed a Reply Brief in Opposition to New Hampshire’s
initial motion. Considering the litigation’s potentially enormous

87 See New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/
case-files/cases/new-hampshire-v-massachusetts (last updated June 28, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/2Y94-NL67] (noting that this dispute focuses on whether
Massachusetts’ tax rule constitutes unconstitutional confiscation).
88 Mass. Dep’t of Revenue, TIR 20-5: Massachusetts Tax Implications of an Employee
Working Remotely Due to the COVID-19 Pandemic, MASS.GOV (Apr. 21, 2020),
https://www.mass.gov/technical-information-release/tir-20-5-massachusetts-taximplications-of-an-employee-working [https://perma.cc/QMB6-X9VY].
89 See 830 MASS. CODE REGS. 62.5A.3 (2020).
90 Governor Chris Sununu, BREAKING: the New Hampshire Department of Justice
is Filing a Lawsuit in the United States Supreme Court Against the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, FACEBOOK (Oct. 19, 2020), https://www.facebook.com/
GovernorChrisSununu/videos/3465352176887977 [https://perma.cc/XT6G-J9TW].
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impact, various other states, organizations, and individuals filed Amicus
Briefs concerning the matter.91 On January 25, 2021, the Supreme Court
invited the acting Solicitor General to file a brief in this case to express
the views of the United States federal government.92 The acting Solicitor
General Elizabeth B. Prelogar responded that this case did not merit the
Court’s original jurisdiction and suggested that any potential harm
upon New Hampshire residents could be sufficiently litigated in
Massachusetts courts.93 After the supplemental briefs by New
Hampshire and Massachusetts, the Supreme Court declined to hear this
case on June 28, 2021.94
On review of New Hampshire, this Article supports New Hampshire
and argues that Massachusetts’ actions are likely unconstitutional.
Massachusetts’ law is bad tax policy and does not accurately reflect the
modern marketplace that exists post-COVID. Downplaying the
importance of the issue by referring to Massachusetts’ tax rule as
“idiosyncratic and temporary”95 is an incorrect assessment that misses
the opportunity to modernize the multistate tax rules for increasing
number of remote workers.
To adequately explain this analysis, this section proceeds as follows:
(1) pro-New Hampshire arguments supporting residence states, (2)
pro-Massachusetts arguments supporting source states, (3) jurisdiction
and standing, and (4) the problem with maintaining the pre-pandemic
status quo in a post-pandemic world is unpacked illustrating the
author’s perspective.
1.

Arguments Supporting Residence States

a.

Commerce Clause

New Hampshire’s first argument is that Massachusetts’ rule violates
the Commerce Clause as an undue burden on interstate commerce.96
Article I of the United States Constitution grants Congress the power
“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes.”97 While first granting an express
91

New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, supra note 87.
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 28, at 4.
93 New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, supra note 87; see Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae, supra note 28, at 4.
94 New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, supra note 87.
95 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 28, at 21.
96 Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 23, at 25-30.
97 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
92
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authority to Congress, this clause also has been read to restrict
regulatory authority of the states that discriminates against or
excessively burdens interstate commerce.98 This second inference is
referred to by many as the “Dormant Commerce Clause” and is
characterized by the United States Supreme Court as a “tangled
underbrush,” or a “quagmire.”99
Despite the doctrine being a quagmire, the following is clear: a state’s
taxation of nonresidents may survive scrutiny under the Commerce
Clause only if it meets four requirements. These four requirements
established in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady100 are that the state’s
tax must be: (1) “applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with
the taxing State”; (2) “fairly apportioned” to activity occurring within
the taxing jurisdiction; (3) nondiscriminatory “against interstate
commerce”; and (4) “fairly related to the services provided by the
State.”101 Since the test is conjunctive, failure to meet all four prongs
spells doom for Massachusetts’ tax rule. Below is a short description of
the arguments that are, or can be, made by New Hampshire and
Massachusetts. Each prong will be further critically assessed in turn in
Part II.A.4.
i.

Substantial Nexus

From the perspective of New Hampshire, the entirety of the taxed
activity occurs in New Hampshire, not in Massachusetts. The
Massachusetts tax rule taxes the income of individuals living and
working wholly within New Hampshire because those individuals
provided services in Massachusetts prior to the pandemic. Even though
the activities of these specific teleworkers used to be in Massachusetts,
the fact is that many of these teleworkers no longer do so. As such, if
the taxpayer is no longer performing activities within Massachusetts,
then the taxpayer seems to lack a current nexus with Massachusetts.
Indeed, it seems but for Massachusetts’ tax rule mandatorily extending
98 See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) (noting that the
Commerce Clause “prohibits economic protectionism-that is, regulatory measures
designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors”
(quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988))).
99 Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1959).
100 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
101 Id. at 279; cf. Adam Timmesch, The Unified Dormant Commerce Clause, 92 TEMPLE
L. REV. 331 (2020) (arguing that Complete Auto is a combination of already existing tests
provided through Pike’s Dormant Commerce Clause test, that there is no significant
difference between the two tests since Wayfair, and that the court should apply the Pike
balancing test for tax cases).

2021]

Taxing Teleworkers

1175

and maintaining the taxpayer’s prior nexus, there is no current nexus
with Massachusetts at all.
Conversely, when it comes to businesses, tax nexus typically only
lasts for “just [a] taxable year.”102 Without a significant level of activity
occurring during the taxable year within Massachusetts, extending
nexus for indefinite periods of times through this tax rule would be
unsound and difficult to prove that taxpayers have actually “retained”
nexus with Massachusetts. Accordingly, New Hampshire teleworkers
likely would lack nexus with Massachusetts but for this extraterritorial
tax rule.
ii.

Fair Apportionment

The Massachusetts tax rule taxes New Hampshire teleworkers’
activities which they perform wholly within New Hampshire.103 So,
where 100 percent of their activities occur in New Hampshire,
Massachusetts’ “fair share” should be zero. Under this theory, not only
is New Hampshire the residence state of the taxpayer, but it is also the
source state of the taxpayer since it is within New Hampshire that the
taxpayer generates their income. Accordingly, New Hampshire and
other residence states have a stronger claim to tax a teleworker’s
income.
Although a teleworker’s employer may still be conducting activities
in Massachusetts, the teleworker is not. This is an important distinction
because the teleworker’s income is taxed, not the employer’s. As such,
the Supreme Court should find that it is fairer to apportion all the
teleworker’s activities to New Hampshire, i.e., the teleworker’s
residence state.
iii. Nondiscrimination
On its face, the Massachusetts extraterritorial tax rule does not seem
to discriminate against interstate commerce as the rule taxes residents
and nonresidents of Massachusetts at the same rates.
In application though, the Massachusetts tax rule does discourage
individuals from working in Massachusetts if they do not also live in
Massachusetts. It also discourages individuals from leaving
Massachusetts because, they will still be subject to Massachusetts’
income tax even if they do leave. The rule then would discourage the
102 Brief for National Taxpayers Union Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 14, New Hampshire v.
Massachusetts, 141 S. Ct. 1262 (Dec. 22, 2020) (No. 22O154).
103 See Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 23, at 11, ¶ 38.
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free flow of workers in interstate commerce to some degree, even
though the rule itself does not discriminate on the basis of residence.
However, the weight of that burden would be hard to measure.
iv. Fair Relationship to Services Provided by the State
While Massachusetts’ income tax system may have been fairly related
to the services Massachusetts provided to a taxpayer pre-pandemic, the
tax rule at issue does not currently “reasonably relate[] to . . . the
activities or presence of the taxpayer”104 within Massachusetts. At this
point, New Hampshire is providing firefighter, police, government,
health, and the like benefits to the taxpayers at issue.105 As such, New
Hampshire is footing the bill to provide New Hampshire teleworkers
government services, not Massachusetts.106
b.

Due Process Clause

New Hampshire’s second argument is that taxing these teleworkers
also likely violates the Due Process Clause. The Due Process Clause107
of the Constitution prohibits a state from taxing value earned outside
its borders because a seizure by the state where there is no jurisdiction
is a denial of due process of law.108 Under Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director,
Div. of Taxation,109 for a tax rule to survive a Due Process Clause
challenge, there must be “some definite link, some minimum
connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it
seeks to tax.”110 Further, when an activity is taxed, “there must be a
connection to the activity itself, rather than a connection only to the
actor the State seeks to tax.”111
First, Massachusetts law reaches beyond its borders and directly taxes
individuals working entirely from their homes outside of
Massachusetts. From a residence state’s point of view, a tax rule like this
seemingly allows Massachusetts to tax a nonresident of Massachusetts
merely because the individual’s employer has an address in
Massachusetts. That fact alone does not seem to be linked to the activity
104

Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 626 (1981).
Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 23, at 10, ¶ 33.
106 Cf. id. at 11, ¶ 34 (noting that because New Hampshire does not have an income
tax, the state pays for government services through various revenue sources).
107 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
108 See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 463 n.11 (1995).
109 504 U.S. 768 (1992).
110 Id. at 777 (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954)).
111 Id. at 778.
105
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that a teleworker performs herself, especially since Massachusetts
banned individual taxpayers from physically traveling to and working
in Massachusetts because of the pandemic. Such travel restrictions
prevent the teleworkers at issue from purposefully availing themselves
of the benefits of Massachusetts.112 Accordingly, the Massachusetts tax
rule appears to violate the Due Process Clause on its face.
Importantly, the Supreme Court has previously held that a Delaware
court lacked jurisdiction over individuals in a derivative action when
those individuals merely held the role of officers and directors for a
Delaware corporation.113 By merely accepting those roles in Delaware,
the individuals had not availed themselves of the privilege of
conducting activities within that forum state.114 As a result, the
individuals were not found to be within the jurisdiction of the Delaware
court.
Similarly, as is the case in New Hampshire, an individual who merely
travels into a state to secure a role at a company arguably does not travel
into that state for the privilege of conducting activities within that state.
If that individual proceeds to telework from a different state after
accepting the job, it seems under the Due Process Clause that
teleworker would lack minimum contacts with the state where their
employer is located.
2.

Arguments Supporting Source States

For this specific case, Massachusetts and other source states can
pressure the Supreme Court to invoke either one of two excuses for
denying acceptance of this case in arguing their below points. This
Section briefly lays out the arguments not just for Massachusetts, but
for source states generally.
The Massachusetts tax rule was passed to help maintain the status
quo from before the pandemic.115 Further, the rule is temporary. Before,
Massachusetts’ income tax system allowed it to “source” income to
Massachusetts in a way that reflected the geographical location of a
taxpayer’s income. If a taxpayer performed income-earning activities in
112 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (discussing that “minimum
contacts” exists in other contacts only when the defendant has “purposefully avail[ed]
itself of the privilege[s] of conducting activities within the forum . . .”).
113 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216-17 (1977).
114 Id.
115 Greg Stohr, High Court Rejects State’s Challenge to Work-from-Home Taxes,
BLOOMBERG (June 28, 2021, 6:31 AM PDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2021-06-28/high-court-rejects-new-hampshire-suit-over-work-from-home-taxes
[https://perma.cc/PSA7-S8GW].
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Massachusetts, then they would be taxed in Massachusetts for those
activities. But for the pandemic, the New Hampshire teleworkers likely
would have continued their income-producing activities in
Massachusetts. So, the tax rule at issue simply allows Massachusetts to
hold onto income tax revenue that it otherwise would likely not have
lost without the pandemic occurring.
Relatedly, the New Hampshire teleworkers at issue chose to work for
a Massachusetts employer before the pandemic, arguably creating a
substantial connection with Massachusetts. The New Hampshire
teleworkers had the opportunity to work outside Massachusetts before
the pandemic. Instead, they purposely availed themselves in
Massachusetts to receive the benefits of working a job in Massachusetts.
So, for the privilege of working for a Massachusetts employer, those
taxpayers choose to have minimum contacts with Massachusetts by
deciding to work for an employer there rather than in another
jurisdiction, thereby justifying the temporary tax rule.
Additionally, the Massachusetts tax rule does not impose different
rates on nonresidents than it does on residents. Instead, it taxes those
individuals who were working in Massachusetts before the pandemic
and who have continued performing the same activities, albeit now in
New Hampshire. And it taxes them the same as those who work and
live in Massachusetts.
Last, Massachusetts’ tax rule does not per se bar states like New
Hampshire from adapting or setting up their own tax policies. So long
as New Hampshire and other states pass laws conforming with the
Constitution, they are free to do so. In this case, Massachusetts is doing
as it has always done: taxing the Massachusetts source income of
nonresidents who work for Massachusetts businesses. Other states do
similarly.116
3.

Original Jurisdiction and Standing

Although this case presents the chance to resolve the long struggle
over the issue concerning taxation of teleworkers, there were two
preliminary issues that would permit the Supreme Court to avoid
reviewing the case. The first is the Supreme Court’s discretion over
whether to exercise its original jurisdiction and the second concerns
New Hampshire’s standing.

116 See, e.g., In re Manohar & Asha Kakar, DTA No. 820440, 2006 WL 721643 (N.Y.
Div. Tax App. Feb. 16, 2006) (indicating examples such as New York taxing nonresidents from New Jersey and even Arizona).
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Original Jurisdiction

Article III of the Constitution gives the Supreme Court “original
Jurisdiction” over cases “affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party.”117 In addition,
the Supreme Court has “appellate Jurisdiction” in all other cases “with
such Exceptions . . . as the Congress shall make.”118 While Congress can
limit the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has
found that Congress may not limit the Court’s original jurisdiction.119
The Supreme Court retains discretion over exercising its original
jurisdiction.120 In part, this is because the Supreme Court believes it is
“structured to perform as an appellate tribunal [and] ill equipped for
the task of factfinding[.]”121 In this same vein, the Supreme Court is
leery of taking cases that might intrude on its chief role as “the supreme
federal appellate court.”122 Because of the breadth of the type of cases
the Constitution grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to hear,
the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution gives them authority
to exercise discretion.123 Otherwise, the Supreme Court’s ability to
administer their docket might be impaired.124
This reasoning worked in favor of Massachusetts’ position. In fact,
Massachusetts rightly noted in their reply that original jurisdiction
should be invoked only “when the necessity [i]s absolute and the matter
itself properly justiciable.”125 As such the necessity for the Supreme
Court to review this case may be questionable. The tax rule affects
particular teleworkers, and those teleworkers chose to work in
Massachusetts rather than New Hampshire. If those individuals wish to
challenge the Massachusetts tax law, they may do so without the
Supreme Court’s deliberation. Indeed, those individuals can challenge
the Massachusetts tax rule by going through the long-established
process of Massachusetts state taxation review.126 Because any
117

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
Id.
119 See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 332-33 (1816).
120 See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 497 (1971).
121 Id. at 498.
122 Id. at 505.
123 See Washington v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 113 (1972).
124 Id.
125 Brief in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 11, New Hampshire
v. Massachusetts, 141 S. Ct. 1262 (Dec. 11, 2020) (No. 22O154) [hereinafter Brief for
Defendant] (quoting Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 15 (1900)).
126 See e.g., id. at 22-24 (noting that individuals can seek relief from Massachusetts’s
Commissioner of Revenue, Appellate Tax Board, and Appeals Court); Brief for the
118
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potentially aggrieved teleworkers can litigate their claims through the
Massachusetts state taxation review system, original jurisdiction is not
necessary to resolve their claims and thus, arguably, should not be
invoked.
While this argument is technically sound, it has flaws. Aggrieved
taxpayers can indeed challenge the Massachusetts tax rule through
Massachusetts’ state taxation review system. But as pointed out by
Edward Zelinsky in his brief to the Supreme Court, the Tax Injunction
Act127 requires taxpayers contesting a state tax law to exhaust the taxing
state’s administrative remedies rather than going to federal court.128
Usually, this means the taxpayer must initiate their case in a state tax
tribunal.129 However, “[t]hese tribunals are typically unsympathetic to
nonresidents’ constitutional rights,” the primary concern at issue in this
case.130 Further, even if a taxpayer exhausts their administrative
remedies, the taxpayer is then left with the Massachusetts state courts
to continue challenging the tax rule.131 Even for taxpayers with
abundant financial resources, the cost and time involved in litigating
such a claim that far is not practical. In addition, many states offer
credits to their residents for income taxes paid to other states. That fact
lessens the incentives for taxpayers to challenge tax rules like
Massachusetts’.132 Supposing the tax rule is unconstitutional, allowing
it to stand only because no one has the resources or time enough to
challenge it seems hardly equitable.
There is some push back on the Supreme Court’s right to retain
discretion over whether to decline jurisdiction over interstate disputes.
In this case, “Justice Thomas and Justice Alito would grant the
motion.”133 They made the same point in Arizona v. California in 2020
and Nebraska v. Colorado in 2016, opining that ”we likely do not have
United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 28, at 11 ( “[I]ndividual taxpayers’
challenges to the tax could be raised through Massachusetts’s procedure for challenging
tax assessments.”).
127 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2018).
128 Brief for Professor Edward A. Zelinsky as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff’s
Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 18, New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, 141
S. Ct. 1262 (Dec. 10, 2020) (No. 22O154).
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 19.
132 Although New Hampshire does not offer such credits to its residents, most other
states do.
133 New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, 141 S. Ct. 1262 (2021) (mem.) (denying
motion for leave to file a bill of complaint). Justices Thomas and Alito would have
granted the motion. Id.
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discretion to decline review in cases within our original jurisdiction that
arise between two or more States.”134 In addition, ten states filed an
amicus brief in this case arguing that such cases should be mandatorily
reviewed by the Supreme Court.135 Their argument stems from a
reading of the Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a), passed by
Congress, which does not state the jurisdiction it confers to the
Supreme Court for original disputes between two or more states is
discretionary.136 Contrastingly, other similar statutes passed along with
this one do give discretion to the Supreme Court for other cases.137 As
such, they argue that since the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction
over original disputes between the states, the Court should be required
to review those cases. Otherwise, states with original disputes might be
left without judicial recourse.
This argument for a mandatory review of original disputes between
the states suffers from two main ailments. First, the States’ construction
of both the Constitution and cited statutes rely on several inferential
leaps. No language explicitly supports their position. Instead, the
argument relies on what is not said. In that way, their argument seems
like the famous one made by Sherlock Holmes of the dog that did not
bark.138 While not damning, the Supreme Court may be reluctant to buy
into this argument, especially considering the second ailment. For the
Supreme Court to adopt this argument, they would need to overturn
decades of precedent where they have held that they do retain
discretion.139 The Supreme Court reads the Constitution as already
inferring discretion to hear cases of original jurisdiction.140 Asking the
Supreme Court to give up that power seems like an unlikely argument
134 Arizona v. California, 140 S. Ct. 684, 684 (2020) (Thomas, J. dissenting); see also
Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034, 1034 (2016) (Thomas, J. dissenting) (“Federal
law does not, on its face, give this Court discretion to decline to decide cases within its
original jurisdiction.”).
135 See Brief of Amici Curiae States of Ohio et al. in Support of New Hampshire’s
Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 1, New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, 141
S. Ct. 1262 (Dec. 21, 2020) (No. 22O154).
136 Id. at 8.
137 Id. at 8-9.
138 SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, 1 SHERLOCK HOLMES: THE COMPLETE NOVELS AND
STORIES 540 (Bantam Books 2003) (1892).
139 Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034, 1034 (2016) (Thomas, J. dissenting)
(“[T]he Court has long exercised such discretion [over Original Jurisdiction cases], and
does so again today in denying, without explanation, Nebraska and Oklahoma’s motion
for leave to file a complaint against Colorado.”).
140 See Vincent L. McKusick, Discretionary Gatekeeping: The US Supreme Court’s
Management of Its Original Jurisdiction Docket Since 1961, 45 ME. L. REV. 185 passim
(2018).
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to prevail given that the Supreme Court retains this discretion as a
means to maintain their supreme appellate court role.
While not all agree that the Supreme Court should be mandated to
review this issue, most agree that this is an important case of great
consequence that the Court should have decided. For one, the dispute
between Massachusetts and New Hampshire is not an isolated affair.
Rather, it represents a larger, older, national issue. To date, five other
states besides Massachusetts have similar laws that directly tax out-ofstate residents on the income they earn working remotely from their
states of residence. Take New York, for example. Not only does it
regularly tax the income of remote workers in neighboring states like
Connecticut and New Jersey, it even taxes nonresidents in states as
distant as Arizona.141 In addition, other states have passed tax laws like
Massachusetts’ in response to the pandemic. For example, Ohio passed
H.B. 197 in 2020, similar to the Massachusetts tax rule, the bill designed
to address the COVID-19 crisis.142 It allows municipalities in Ohio to
tax employees working from home during the pandemic and for thirty
days afterwards as if they were still working as they were before the
pandemic. While this does not allow the state of Ohio itself to act as the
state of Massachusetts is allowed to under its rule, it does allow an Ohio
municipality to tax income of workers who neither live nor work within
the taxing jurisdiction of that municipality. That could include
individuals who now live outside of Ohio altogether. Laws like these
would result in billions of dollars of fiscal confusion and losses for many
states since they end up crediting their residents for taxes paid to these
other states. Accordingly, the profound economic consequences of
these laws warrant review by the Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court
had resolved this case, the decision could have determined how similar
issues throughout the country should be resolved.
Last, if the Supreme Court is concerned about maintaining its role as
an appellate court, it may appoint a Special Master to take evidence and
present a ruling.143 This would allow the Supreme Court to maintain its
appellate role and review the special master’s finding should there be

141 In re Manohar & Asha Kakar, DTA No. 820440, 2006 WL 721643 (N.Y. Div. Tax
App. Feb. 16, 2006).
142 H.B. 197, 133d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2020).
143 Shira Scheindlin, The Use of Special Masters in Complex Cases, LAW360 (Aug. 15,
2017, 11:36 AM EDT), https://www.jamsadr.com/files/uploads/documents/articles/
scheindlin-law360-the-use-of-special-masters-in-complex-cases-2017-08-15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HZ3P-FEBR] (noting how, with the parties’ consent, a special master
can perform a variety of special duties including “mak[ing] or recommend[ing] findings
of fact”).
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any intensive fact-finding. That seems unlikely though since the issue
in New Hampshire was a question of law: that being whether the
Massachusetts’ tax rule amounts to an unconstitutional confiscation of
nonresident income. Still, the ability to appoint a Special Master
undermines the notion that the Supreme Court is “illequipped” for fact
finding.144
b.

Standing

Also at issue is whether New Hampshire has standing to bring this
case. Under Massachusetts’ theory, New Hampshire is merely grafting
its aggrieved citizens’ claims onto itself and claiming that New
Hampshire itself is threatened. If so, this likely would not be enough for
New Hampshire to have standing.145 Instead, New Hampshire must bear
its own injuries. And those injuries must be serious.146
This argument is fairly sound. In many ways, New Hampshire appears
to lack standing. Arguably, Massachusetts’ tax rule does not deter
businesses or persons from moving into New Hampshire. If a business
or person moves to New Hampshire to both live and work there, that
business or person will not trigger Massachusetts’ tax rule. That rule
may discourage persons from living in New Hampshire and working in
Massachusetts, but again, the challenged tax rule does not discourage
the movement of people and businesses into New Hampshire outright.
Further, Massachusetts argues that its tax rule is temporary and was
passed in response to a state of emergency.147
Nevertheless, “[e]mergency does not create power.”148 As for the
temporariness of this rule, Massachusetts has extended its effect
repeatedly.149 It does not follow that because a State had nexus with an
144

Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 498 (1971).
See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 8 (2001) (“[I]n order to invoke . . .
original jurisdiction, ‘the State must show a direct interest of its own and not merely
seek recovery for the benefit of individuals who are the real parties in interest.’” (quoting
Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 396 (1938))).
146 See North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374 (1923).
147 Cf. Brief in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 7 ¶ 2, New
Hampshire v. Massachusetts, 141 S. Ct. 1262 (Dec. 11, 2020) (No. 22O154) (indicating
the April 21 emergency regulation maintained the status quo for personal income tax).
148 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425 (1934).
149 830 MASS. CODE REGS. 62.5A.3 (2021) (first promulgated on October 16, 2020;
re-promulgated on March 5, 2021); TIR 20-15: Revised Guidance on the Massachusetts
Tax Implications of an Employee Working Remotely Due to the COVID-19 Pandemic,
MASS.GOV (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.mass.gov/technical-information-release/tir-2015-revised-guidance-on-the-massachusetts-tax-implications-of [https://perma.cc/GR7CZ633] [hereinafter TIR 20-15] (indicating extension until ninety days after the state of
145
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individual before the pandemic that it maintains that nexus so long as
there is a pandemic. Afterall, a tax nexus can expire if not maintained.
To allow otherwise is to permit “trailing nexus on steroids[.]”150 The
fact that this law attempts to continue the status quo from before the
pandemic does lean in favor of Massachusetts, yet for the reasons
discussed below, there are drawbacks to preserving that status quo.
Declining to hear this case, the Supreme Court may have thought that
New Hampshire did not have standing to bring this suit. New
Hampshire’s chief claimed injury in this case is the invasion of its
sovereignty. This theory relies on the assumption that by Massachusetts
taxing a New Hampshire resident’s income, Massachusetts strips New
Hampshire of its power to tax or not tax its residents living and working
wholly within the state as it sees fit. Granted, tax nexus is more
complicated than that, but consider the problem from the view of a
different body of law; one generally would not expect an individual
living and working wholly within State A would be subject to the
criminal laws of another state, State B, by committing a crime in State
A. But that is what Massachusetts’ tax rule does — not just figuratively,
but literally. If a New Hampshire resident at issue fails to comply with
Massachusetts’ tax rule despite working and living wholly within New
Hampshire, they may be subject to both civil and criminal penalties in
Massachusetts. In that way, Massachusetts steps over the border and
places more than just tax jurisdiction over a New Hampshire resident.
And from New Hampshire’s end, it could not remedy this situation even
if it changed its tax policies. Accordingly, this further indicates that
Massachusetts’ tax rule undermines New Hampshire’s sovereignty over
its citizens. For those reasons, this case is not merely one where New
Hampshire is standing in the shoes of its citizens; it brings its own
issues.
Even if New Hampshire is not itself harmed by these laws, arguably
the state can assert parens patriae standing because it has a quasisovereign interest in protecting the “health and well-being — both
physical and economic — of its residents.”151 Regardless, even if New
Hampshire lacked these above means of standing, other States are
harmed by these laws. As discussed above, five other States besides
Massachusetts have tax rules that tax remote workers outside of their
emergency in Massachusetts has been lifted); see also HODGSON RUSS LLP, supra note 69
(indicating original applicability between March 10, 2020 and December 31, 2020).
150 Paul Williams, Justices Should Block Mass. Telework Tax Rule, Prof Says, LAW360
(Dec. 2, 2020, 8:25 PM EST), https://www.law360.com/tax-authority/articles/1332419/
justices-should-block-mass-telework-tax-rule-prof-says [https://perma.cc/3AB2-YL6K].
151 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
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borders. This results in the risk of double taxation of interstate
telecommuters while the States also suffer fiscally by giving credits to
their taxpayers to alleviate undesirable conditions. Further, it is
typically the teleworker’s home state that provides them with public
services. So, not only is a teleworker’s home state providing them with
public services, it also in a sense subsidizes the other source state by
providing them with tax credits. As a result, the teleworker’s home state
suffers a concrete, fiscal loss.
In sum, this Article argues that New Hampshire does, in fact, have
standing to bring suit. Or if not New Hampshire, then other similarly
aggrieved States. It is regrettable that the Supreme Court did not accept
this case to resolve the issue concerning the taxation of teleworkers
post-pandemic.
4.

Constitutional Challenges in Maintaining Pre-COVID Work
Arrangements for Tax Purposes

Built on the various arguments of the residence and source states
introduced in the previous Subparts, and despite the Supreme Court’s
decision not to hear this case, this Subpart addresses the author’s view
of the merits of New Hampshire’s constitutional claims as well as its
standing issue.
The question is whether Massachusetts may continue to tax the
income of a nonresident worker who once worked physically in
Massachusetts but now, because of the COVID-19 pandemic, does not
live in or work physically in the taxing state. This problem originates
from Massachusetts’ attempt to maintain pre-COVID work
arrangements as the status quo and as it tries to exercise its
extraterritorial taxing right as a source state on nonresident’s income.
As explained in Part II.B. below, Massachusetts’ new rule emulates New
York’s “convenience of the employer” rule, which treats out-of-state
telecommuters’ income as always sourced in New York unless the
remote work is performed for the necessity of the employer. Projecting
a source state’s taxing power extraterritorially on nonresidents’ income
even if they are not physically present in the source state has been
seriously criticized by many scholars.152
152 See, e.g., Meredith A. Bentley, Huckaby v. New York State Division of Tax
Appeals: In Upholding the Current Tax Treatment of Telecommuters, the Court of Appeals
Demonstrates the Need for Legislative Action, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1147, 1152-53 (2006)
(describing the negative impact of New York’s rule that taxes telecommuters); see also
Brian C. Borie, The Convenience of the Employer Test: Why We Should Reconsider the
Critique of New York’s Tax Apportionment Scheme, 72 ALB. L. REV. 789, 790 (2009)
(noting the criticism New York’s rule has experienced).
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Hence, although the problem in New Hampshire has occurred in the
wake of COVID-19, the issue is not new. The primary concern
addressed herein is whether a source state’s extraterritorial taxation of
nonresident teleworkers’ income is constitutional, especially when
teleworkers are not physically present in the source state. This requires
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis because the aggressive source
taxation may harm free movement across states and adversely impact
interstate commerce.153
Again, for Massachusetts to pass the Dormant Commerce Clause test,
its new law must be (1) applied to an activity with a substantial nexus
within the taxing state; (2) fairly apportioned; (3) nondiscriminatory —
i.e., does it discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) fairly
related to the services provided by the state.154 If Massachusetts fails on
any one of these four prongs in the Complete Auto test, then the entire
tax rule fails. This Article argues that the Massachusetts tax rule fails
this test and is unconstitutional.
(1) Substantial Nexus. Currently, the substantial nexus standard is in
a state of flux as the Court reconciles traditional tax systems with a
changing global economy that operates primarily online.155 To justify
Massachusetts’ tax rule at issue, Massachusetts must have a substantial
nexus to the individual taxpayers to justify the income tax.156
In expanding the nexus definition in South Dakota v. Wayfair, the
Court held that $100,000 in annual online sales in the state constitutes
a substantial nexus because “the seller availed itself of the substantial
privilege of carrying on business in South Dakota.”157 Some
commentators might argue that because the Supreme Court scrapped
the physical presence requirement for the substantial nexus prong in
Wayfair, the virtual connection between the remote workers and
Massachusetts would be enough to satisfy the substantial nexus

153 See MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Ill. Dep’t of Rev., 553 U.S. 16, 24 (2008) (indicating
that the Constitution forbids states from imposing taxes that burden or discriminate
interstate commerce, including burdening interstate commerce through multiple or
unfairly apportioned taxation). Here, Dormant Commerce Clause analysis is required
to determine whether a state’s extraterritorial taxation of nonresidents burdens
interstate commerce and is therefore unconstitutional.
154 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
155 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2095 (2018) (noting a “dramatic”
change in technology and commerce and how the Court “should not maintain a rule
that ignores” [the virtual connection retail companies have to states] in overturning
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992)).
156 See id. at 2099.
157 Id.
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prong.158 However, this Article argues that it might satisfy some degree
of connection, but it does not automatically satisfy “substantial”
connection. We still must examine whether that connection constitutes
“substantial” nexus.159 In addition, Wayfair is a sales tax case, whereas
New Hampshire deals with income tax issues. So, the threshold for
substantial nexus is likely different, but the question remains the same:
at what point has a nonresident created a substantial nexus that triggers
the application of Massachusetts’ tax?
Massachusetts once had a substantial nexus on workers who worked
physically in Massachusetts. However, since the pandemic, it now
seems to lack this substantial nexus. Even before the pandemic,
Massachusetts did not exercise taxing right as a source state for
nonresident teleworkers who were not physically present there.160
However, it extended its tax jurisdiction to workers who are now
teleworking. The only justification offered by Massachusetts is that the
rule is temporary.161
Such argument would be more persuasive if Massachusetts’ tax rule
was genuinely temporary. Although remote working began primarily
for public health purposes, lifestyle have changed, and accordingly,
Massachusetts’ nexus has decreased significantly. Massachusetts’ claim
that its rule is temporary is not supported by fact as it ignores permanent
158 See, e.g., Darien Shanske, Remote Workforce Doctrine and Policy: Short-Term and
Long-Term Considerations, COLUM. J. TAX L. (Oct. 21, 2020), https://journals.library.
columbia.edu/index.php/taxlaw/announcement/view/350 [https://perma.cc/Z259-Z6MJ]
(noting courts’ recognition of the declining meaningfulness of physical presence as it
relates to economic activity); Hayes Holderness, Navigating 21st Century Tax
Jurisdiction, 79 MD. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2019) (recognizing that Wayfair eliminated the
physical presence requirement, although presenting larger issues over the Dormant
Commerce Clause nexus requirement).
159 See, e.g., Edward Zelinsky, Taxing Interstate Remote Workers After New
Hampshire v. Massachusetts: The Current Status of the Debate 3-4 (Cardozo Sch. of L.
Jacob Burns Inst. for Advanced Legal Stud., Faculty Research Paper No. 656, 2021)
[hereinafter Current Status].
160 See, e.g., 830 MASS. CODE REGS. 62.5A.1(5)(a) (2008) (“When a non-resident
employee is able to establish the exact amount of pay received for services performed in
Massachusetts, that amount is the amount of Massachusetts source income.”); MASS.
DEP’T OF REVENUE, LETTER RULING 84-57, WITHHOLDING FOR NON-RESIDENT EMPLOYEES
(Aug. 2, 1984), https://www.mass.gov/letter-ruling/letter-ruling-84-57-withholdingfor-non-resident-employees [https://perma.cc/NN3P-DSQQ] (“Compensation . . .
rendered by a non-resident wholly outside Massachusetts, even though payment may
be made from an office or place of business in Massachusetts of the employer, [was] not
subject to the individual income tax.”).
161 Brief for Defendant, supra note 125, passim (in defending the rule, Massachusetts
continually refers to the rule as temporary throughout the brief); see also Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 28, at 21.
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shifts to teleworking and has extended this rule twice.162 Nobody truly
knew when this “temporary” rule would cease to exist until
Massachusetts conveniently ended the state of emergency right before
the Supreme Court decision on June 28, 2021.163
However, Massachusetts may still have some nexus as a state that
offers employment opportunities, but it is far less substantial compared
to the services provided by New Hampshire amid COVID-19.
Nonresident workers being taxed do not receive the services of the
Massachusetts police, fire services, road or highway construction, water
systems, or utilities. Further, teleworkers are not relying on
Massachusetts’ systems or government; instead, New Hampshire
provides all of these services and has the governmental structure in
place to support their lifestyle during this difficult time. Despite this,
their income is being taxed not by New Hampshire, but Massachusetts
which lacks a substantial nexus.
(2) Fair Apportionment. The new Massachusetts tax rule lacks fair
apportionment. Massachusetts’ pre-pandemic tax rule applicable to
teleworkers correctly apportioned its tax between source and residence
states because Massachusetts only taxed nonresident’s income for days
they were physically present in Massachusetts. Income for days they
telecommuted from home would only be taxed by the residence state.
However, the temporary rule lacks apportionment for telecommuters
by treating all working days sourced in Massachusetts, regardless of the
worker’s physical presence.
Although a residence state may offer a tax credit for taxes paid to
another state, this should not be considered in determining the fair
apportionment issue because the critical question is whether
Massachusetts’ tax rule is being apportioned correctly, not if the
residence state’s tax rules reduce harm to the individual. In the end the
residence state is harmed by unconstitutional overreaching. A residence
state’s tax rule may remedy double taxation, but this does not equate to
fair apportionment. The broader principles of apportionment require a
source state’s tax rule exercising extraterritorial taxing power to account
for the general burden on the tax system itself.

162 See 830 MASS. CODE REGS. 62.5A.3 (2020) (first promulgated on October 16,
2020; re-promulgated on March 5, 2021); TIR 20-15, supra note 149 (indicating
extension until 90 days after the state of emergency in Massachusetts has been lifted).
163 Mass. Exec. Order No. 69 (May 28, 2021), https://www.mass.gov/doc/covid-19order-69/download [https://perma.cc/PJT8-KJPR] (ending COVID-19 emergency
effective June 15, 2021).
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In Allied Signal, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation,164 the Court held
that a New Jersey tax on all of a corporation’s out-of-state activities,
irrespective of its actual connection to New Jersey, was unconstitutional
because it was not apportioned correctly and to adopt New Jersey’s rule
would disrupt much of the nation’s tax system and was “certain to result
in double taxation”165 Likewise, Massachusetts is seeking to tax 100
percent of a nonresident teleworker’s income that is earned entirely outof-state, irrespective of its actual connection to Massachusetts, based on
the premise that the nonresident teleworker had once chosen to
commute to Massachusetts physically. This premise violates “the basic
proposition that a State may not tax value earned outside its borders.”166
Similarly, in J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen,167 the Supreme Court
found that an Indiana tax that taxed gross receipts of income of
nonresidents originally sourced in Indiana was unconstitutional
because it did so without apportionment.168 More specifically, Indiana
was taxing one percent of sales made to out-of-state customers,
resulting in double taxation of Indiana’s sales outside of the state.169
This rule was too broad and lacked the required apportionment to pass
constitutional muster and not burden interstate commerce. Similarly,
Massachusetts’ law is too broad as it seeks to tax 100 percent of the
income earned by nonresidents who neither work physically nor live in
Massachusetts.
(3) Discrimination against Interstate Commerce. The risk of a state
instituting a taxing policy that would burden interstate commerce
through double taxation is not a new problem. In Comptroller of
Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne,170 the Court addressed Maryland’s
policy of not extending a tax credit to state residents who paid taxes in
another state, thereby having a portion of the taxpayers income taxed
twice.171 The Court noted that a state under the Dormant Commerce
Clause must not “impose a tax which discriminates against interstate
commerce either by providing a direct commercial advantage to local

164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171

504 U.S. 768, 784-85 (1992).
Id. at 785.
Id. at 784.
304 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1938).
Id. at 310-11.
Id. at 311.
575 U.S. 542, 549-51 (2015).
Id. at 545.
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business, or by subjecting interstate commerce to the burden of
multiple taxation.”172
Although double taxation itself does not necessarily violate the
Dormant Commerce Clause, double taxation due to a discriminatory
tax does.173 The Court has repeatedly held, including in Wynne, that
state tax law must be internally consistent to comply with the Dormant
Commerce Clause. With internal consistency, the court considers if
taxpayers would face a higher tax burden if they engaged in interstate
commerce versus intrastate commerce. This test assumes the challenged
state law is universally employed by every state law and then assesses
the burden between the two hypothetical states.174 If the burden is
greater for interstate commerce, then it is not fairly apportioned and
nondiscriminatory.
In applying the internal consistency test, the income tax
consequences of the following four taxpayers are compared: (i) a
resident of Massachusetts with source income from Massachusetts, (ii)
a nonresident of Massachusetts with source income from
Massachusetts, (iii) a resident of Massachusetts with source income
from another state, and (iv) a nonresident of Massachusetts with source
income from another state. Also consider that when applying this test,
the results must be different and less burdensome for nonresidents
because a source state’s taxing power upon a nonresident is
constitutionally restrained.175 However, before applying the test, it is
important to note that the specific application of the internal
consistency test would be different from that in Wynne, because the
contested rules are different. In Wynne, the overall tax rates and tax
credit policy of the residence state (Maryland) were at issue, whereas in
New Hampshire, the “sourcing rule” for nonresidents’ income by the
source state (Massachusetts) is at issue. Hence, Massachusetts’ tax
credit rules should not get to the internal consistency test in this case.
Applying the internal consistency test to the sourcing rule as well as the
tax credits rule would trap the analysis into such circular logic that
Massachusetts would be able to expand its sourcing rule for
nonresidents’ income without any constraint as long as it offered tax

172 Id. at 549-50 (quoting Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450, 458 (1959)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
173 Michael S. Knoll & Ruth Mason, New York’s Unconstitutional Tax Residence Rule,
85 STATE TAX NOTES 707, 710 (2017).
174 Adam B. Thimmesch, The Unified Dormant Commerce Clause, 92 TEMPLE L. REV.
331, 362-64 (2020).
175 HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 391.
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credits, because such tax credits would arguably make the rule
internally consistent, which is not correct.
The hypothetical assumption of the internal consistency test
continues with every state that universally adopts Massachusetts’
temporary sourcing rule and then the above four situations are
compared with the burden placed on interstate taxation. However, the
internal consistency test should not just compare the impact on the
absolute tax rates of resident and nonresident individuals,176 but should
consider the impact of each state unconstitutionally extending its
sourcing rule, and thus taxing right, and the impact that would have on
interstate commerce.
Before the pandemic, a Massachusetts resident teleworker paid
Massachusetts income tax on all income, including that from
Massachusetts source. A nonresident teleworker paid Massachusetts
income tax only if the income was sourced from Massachusetts and only
for days the person was physically present — the teleworking days did
not count as being physically present in Massachusetts. A state like
Connecticut would then provide a tax credit for taxes paid to
Massachusetts in a fair apportionment.177 Thus, there was likely a low
chance of double taxation for nonresident teleworkers.
In contrast, Massachusetts’ new tax rule shows internal inconsistency.
The tax consequences of the Massachusetts resident teleworker remain
the same. However, if a nonresident starts teleworking, the person is
now subject to the risk of double taxation because Massachusetts can
reach beyond its borders to tax a nonresident not working in
Massachusetts. This is true even under the hypothetical assumption of
fifty state adoption of the Massachusetts tax rule. Although the
residence state might offer a tax credit, do not let that masquerade the
unconstitutionality of the realities of the sourcing state that should be
the absolute consideration of the internal consistency test.
The application of the internal consistency test should not just
consider a numerical tax rate but rather the newly created double
taxation risk on nonresident teleworkers by ignoring the changed fact
that the person is no longer physically commuting to Massachusetts.
The internal consistency test needs to review the impact on interstate
commerce as if every state could tax nonresidents without a proper
apportionment. This would expose a nonresident interstate teleworker

176 Michael S. Knoll & Ruth Mason, The Economic Foundation of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 103 VA. L. REV. 309, 321, 329 (2017) [hereinafter DCC].
177 See CONN. AGENCIES REGS. §§ 12-704(a)-1, 12-704(c)-1 (1994).
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to the very risk of double taxation expressly banned under the Dormant
Commerce Clause in Wynne.
Massachusetts hopes that a residence state’s tax credit remedies this
issue. Those who remember that Wynne took into consideration tax
rates under the source state and the residence state tax, as well as
Maryland’s tax credit rules, might be distracted by this argument and
ask, “if every state offers tax credits for other states’ taxes, the double
taxation risk would be relieved. Then is it not internally consistent?”
The answer should be no. Again, the issue in New Hampshire is the
constitutionality of the sourcing rule of the source state. Double tax
relief is offered by the residence state. When the issue is the overall tax
rates and tax credits as in Wynne, comparing the end result after the tax
credits would be the right approach for the internal consistency test.
However, when the issue is the sourcing rule of the source state,
justifying the extraterritorial sourcing rule at the expense of tax credits
offered by the residence state is clearly wrong. That is not how the
internal consistency test was devised to be used. As Michael Knoll and
Ruth Mason, the leading scholars of internal consistency test,
emphasize, the double taxation issue must be distinguished from the
discrimination issue.178 “[W]hether a state tax regime violates the
dormant Commerce Clause depends on its impact on cross-border
commerce, not on whether it generates double taxation.”179 Although
the result of double taxation might be mitigated by some measure
offered by the residence state, that does not make a challenged source
state’s discriminatory rule constitutional.
The taxing of out-of-state residents, irrespective of where they move
to, ignores the burden this potentially places on the moving of taxpayers
from state to state. Taxpayers should have the freedom to move from a
less desirable state to a more desirable state without the risk of a state
where they no longer live or work pursuing them for tax purposes. To
allow this burden harms states like New Hampshire, Florida, and Texas
disproportionately more than states like California or Illinois, because
New Hampshire, Florida, and Texas have no income tax. With
Massachusetts’ rule, Massachusetts’ residents have little incentive to
move to those states for the tax advantage — the express reason these
states do not have an income tax — thereby burdening interstate
commerce and discriminating against the new residents of other states.
This is a clear burden on interstate commerce.
178 Knoll & Mason, DCC, supra note 176, at 314, 331; see also Michael S. Knoll &
Ruth Mason, Comptroller v. Wynne: Internal Consistency, a National Marketplace, and
Limits on State Sovereignty to Tax, 163 U. PENN. L. REV. ONLINE 267, 281 (2015).
179 Knoll & Mason, DCC, supra note 176, at 331.
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(4) Fair Relationship to the Services. Last, the tax must be fairly related
to the services provided by Massachusetts. On one hand, New
Hampshire argues that Massachusetts is taxing activity that is not
happening in its state at all. This argument is persuasive but goes more
to the issue of substantial nexus prong — not the fairly related prong.
The question here asks whether the tax in question is “fairly related to
the services provided by the State.”180 This prong may be satisfied by
Massachusetts.
The employment laws of Massachusetts protect nonresident
taxpayers. If a nonresident employee experienced discrimination by
their out-of-state employer or if their out-of-state employer stopped
paying their salary, it would be in a Massachusetts court and under
Massachusetts law that the dispute would be resolved. This likely
constitutes as being fairly related and this prong seems to be satisfied.
Nonetheless, the fourth prong of Complete Auto test must be satisfied
in conjunction with the remaining three prongs. In fact, the Court has
found that a tax violated the fourth prong in only one case, where the
Court also found that the tax violated the second and third prongs as
well.181 Hence, it is expected that the Court would offer a less apparent
view on the fourth prong or blend the analysis with the other prongs of
the Complete Auto test.
In sum, the Supreme Court may likely find that Massachusetts’ tax
rule violates the Dormant Commerce Clause because the teleworkers’
activity does not have a substantial nexus to Massachusetts,
Massachusetts’ tax rule lacks fair apportionment, and it discriminates
among interstate commerce by creating the unjustifiable double
taxation of nonresident teleworkers’ income.
Now, in relation to the Due Process Clause, the Court’s analysis
would be similar to its analysis on Commerce Clause, as Justice Stewart
emphasized that “[t]hese two claims are closely related.”182 However,
the critical difference between the two clauses concerns which branch
has the final say on the clause.183 As to the Commerce Clause, Congress
has the power to enact legislation that might have a different approach

180 Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S 175, 197 (1995) (quoting
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).
181 See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 291 (1987).
182 Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967). When
the Supreme Court revisited National Bellas Hess in Quill, it did not use Due Process
Clause but rested the tax nexus analysis entirely on the Commerce Clause. However,
this position in Quill was overruled in Wayfair, where the Court consider the tax nexus
issue under both the Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause.
183 HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 34-35.
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from the Court’s holdings on the Commerce Clause.184 Conversely, the
Supreme Court has generally had the final say on the Due Process
Clause.185 Under either clause though, the Supreme Court should find
strong reasons to find the Massachusetts rule unconstitutional.
Any hesitation for the Supreme Court to take this case was based on
the preliminary issues, presented in Part II.A.3. New Hampshire has a
policy position of having no income tax to attract businesses and people
to live there.186 This creates a standing issue because New Hampshire
may be considered not bearing any injuries on its own because the
Massachusetts tax rule causes no foregone tax revenue. In addition, the
Supreme Court retains discretion over whether to exercise its original
jurisdiction. If the Court thinks that a judicial solution to the interstate
commerce tax problem would be inadequate, it may not exercise its
original jurisdiction; and it did. Many scholars, including the author,
agree that Congress would be the best candidate to resolve the interstate
commerce tax problem, such as the taxing of teleworkers’ income.187
However, mandating a uniform tax rule for teleworkers by federal
legislation has various paths, and it could take some time for
policymakers to take one. In the meantime, teleworkers will suffer from
the double taxation that results from so-called “temporary” rules
adopted by source states. Invalidating those temporary rules projecting
a source state’s taxing power extraterritorially can still resolve the issue
because the existing rule on source and residence would then be applied
and that does not create a discriminatory double tax problem.
For these reasons, this Article regrets that the Supreme Court decided
not to review this case. The fact that the Justices asked the Acting
Solicitor General to express the federal government’s views might have
implied that the Court wanted to punt the issue to the legislative body.
Part IV discusses the legislative solution in greater details.188
184 See Norman R. Williams, Why Congress May Not “Overrule” the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 53 UCLA L. REV. 153, 154-55 (2005).
185 See id. at 169.
186 Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint, supra note 23, at 1, ¶ 1-2.
187 See, e.g., Richard D. Pomp, New Hampshire v. Massachusetts: Taxation Without
Representation?, 39 J. STATE TAX’N 19, 21 n.9 (2021) (“Congress is the best suited
institution to develop a systemic solution to the taxation of nonresidents.”); Darien
Shanske, Agglomeration and State Personal Income Taxes: Time to Apportion (with Critical
Commentary on New Hampshire’s Complaint Against Massachusetts), 48 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 949, 964 (2021) (“[T]he Court needs to . . . prompt congressional action.”);
Zelinsky, Coronavirus, supra note 64, at 1102 (“If the governor won’t stop New York’s
irrational income tax penalty for nonresident telecommuters on the days they work at
home, Congress should.”).
188 See infra Part IV.
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B. Old Battles Against New York
1.

New York’s “Convenience of the Employer” Rule

COVID-19 has reignited the debate about New York, and a handful
of other states’, taxation of nonresidents’ income through the
convenience of the employer rule.189 For New York to implement a
taxation of nonresidents, it must follow the same requirements every
other state in the United States must follow: a nonresident tax must
abide by the constitutional limitations under the Dormant Commerce
Clause and Due Process Clause. For example, New York adheres to
these limitations by only taxing nonresidents on the taxable income
derived from sources in New York.190 If nonresident employees perform
services for employers both in and outside of New York, then income
derived from New York sources is based on a ratio of working days in
New York to total working days.191 This tax is essentially a fraction,
where the employee’s total working days in New York (Din) are divided
by the employee’s total number of working days (Dtotal).192 This fraction
is then multiplied by the individual’s wages earned from that New York
employer (WNY) to determine tentative taxable income.193 The equation
is as follows:

189 To date, six states employ this test: Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Nebraska,
New York, and Pennsylvania. See Jared Walczak, Teleworking Employees Face Double
Taxation Due to Aggressive “Convenience Rule” Policies in Seven States, TAX FOUND.
(Aug. 13, 2020), https://taxfoundation.org/remote-work-from-home-teleworking
[https://perma.cc/R4BE-DH9V]; see also ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 26-51-202, 26-51-435
(2021); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1124(b)(1)(b) (2021); 316 NEB. ADMIN. CODE
§ 003.01C(1) (2021); N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 601(e)(1), 631(a)(1), 631(b)(1)(B) (2021); N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 132.18(a) (2021); 61 PA. CODE § 109.8 (2021); STATE
OF CONN., DEP’T OF REVENUE SERVS., 2019 LEGISLATIVE CHANGES AFFECTING THE INCOME
TAX AND THE INCOME TAX WITHHOLDING 4 (2020), https://portal.ct.gov//media/DRS/Publications/pubssn/2019/SN-2019(12).pdf [https://perma.cc/K7SE-9GGM]
(eventually, Connecticut intends to adopt this rule by amending Connecticut General
Statutes section 12-711(b)(2)); Letter from John Theis, Revenue Legal Couns., State of
Ark., Dep’t of Fin. & Admin., to redacted party seeking legal opinion (Feb. 20, 2020),
https://www.ark.org/dfa-act896/index.php/api/document/download/20200203.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z4HB-MQUZ].
190 N.Y. TAX LAW § 601(e) (2021); Edward A. Zelinsky, New York’s Ill-Advised
Taxation of Nonresidents During COVID-19, 2020 TAX NOTES 1001, 1002 [hereinafter
Zelinsky, Ill-Advised Taxation].
191 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 132.18(a) (2021).
192 Memorandum from the N.Y. State Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., Off. of Tax Pol’y
Analysis, Tech. Servs. Div. (May 15, 2006), https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/memos/income/
m06_5i.pdf [https://perma.cc/GUK2-H2YT].
193 Id.
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(Din/Dtotal) x WNY = New York Tentative Taxable Income
Thus, only a part of the income earned by nonresident employees is
attributed to New York. But New York’s taxation might not be as
innocent or straightforward as one would think. When determining Din,
New York includes the number of days working out-of-state as being
“in New York” if the employee works out-of-state for the employee’s or
employer’s convenience, such as deciding to work from home or
telecommuting. This doctrine only counts days worked not in New
York if the employee worked out of state due to the employer’s
necessity.194 Under the convenience of the employer rule, if an
individual is telecommuting for the employer’s necessity, then New York
would consider it as out-of-state source income and not include these
days in Din.195 Conversely, if telecommuting is for the employee’s or
employer’s convenience rather than the employer’s necessity, then the
days worked are counted in Din, and the income is deemed as New York
source income and taxed by New York.196 This doctrine is experiencing
additional scrutiny and animosity due to the rise of teleworkers brought
about by the COVID-19 pandemic.
2.

Extension to Teleworkers

The convenience of the employer rule is probably one of the most
controversial tax issues faced today due to New York’s stance that
“telecommuting is for the employee’s convenience” and is not for the
convenience or necessity of the employer.197 Hence, New York exercises
its tax jurisdiction extraterritorially and taxes income earned outside its
borders by nonresidents who telecommute from their out-of-state
homes.
Following New York’s lead, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware,
Nebraska, and Pennsylvania have mirrored New York’s convenience of
the employer doctrine.198 Further, Massachusetts’ emergency regulation
194 NY COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 132.18(a) (2021); Zelinsky, Ill-Advised
Taxation, supra note 190, at 1002.
195 § 132.18(a); Zelinsky, Ill-Advised Taxation, supra note 190, at 1002.
196 § 132.18(a); Zelinsky, Ill-Advised Taxation, supra note 190, at 1003.
197 Zelinsky, Ill-Advised Taxation, supra note 190, at 1003.
198 316 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 003.01C(1) (2021); 61 PA. CODE § 109.8 (1999); see,
e.g., STATE OF CONN., DEP’T OF REVENUE SERV., supra note 189, at 4 (eventually,
Connecticut intends to adopt this rule by amending Connecticut General Statutes
section 12-711(b)(2)); DELAWARE SCHEDULE W: APPORTIONMENT WORKSHEET (2017),
https://revenuefiles.delaware.gov/docs/TY17_schedulewe.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2X3FZE4] (a worksheet for a nonresident who performs services for an employer both in
and outside Delaware to apportion compensation based on the ratio that compares the
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taxing telecommuters who are displaced due to the COVID-19
pandemic emulates New York’s approach.199
As demonstrated by the growth of similar rules, the convenience of
the employer rule can be seen as taxing certain intangibles that justify
this sort of taxation. Some may argue the tax is justified because of the
increased salary, reputational recognition, or access to clients that rely
on New York companies. Although some of these benefits can be
captured at the entity level, others cannot. By using the convenience of
the employer rule, New York can capture gains from individuals who
experience particular benefits that can only be derived from working at
a New York firm.
This concept is furthered by comparing it to a “classic local
government finance issue as to cities and suburbs. If a big portion of a
city’s tax as moves to the lower tax suburbs around the city, then the
city is going to have a harder time providing the amenities that made it
a city worth living near to begin with.”200 New York maintains a
reputation that benefits those who are tied to it. The convenience of the
employer rule can be viewed as a tax that prevents individuals from
taking advantage of the benefits derived from working for a New York
firm and as creating solidarity for all New York workers.
Nonetheless, many commentators criticize this rule as
unconstitutional and poor tax policy, especially when it extends to
taxing telecommuters.201 In 2005, a majority of the Court of Appeals of

total number of days worked in Delaware and the total number of days worked outside
Delaware); Letter from John Theis, supra note 189 (providing a legal opinion that a
client is required to file Arkansas income tax returns and pay tax on that portion of their
income from their Arkansas employment).
199 Zelinsky, Ill-Advised Taxation, supra note 190, at 1003.
200 Shanske, supra note 158.
201 See, e.g., HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 391-402 (discussing cases and issues
arising from the application of this and similar rules to the personal income of
nonresidents); Morgan L. Holcomb, Tax My Ride: Taxing Commuters in Our National
Economy, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 885 (2008) (criticizing “the double taxation that can occur
when two states claim to be the source of income”); William V. Vetter, New York’s
Convenience of the Employer Rule Conveniently Collects Cash from Nonresidents, Part 2,
42 STATE TAX NOTES 229, 238 (2006) (arguing that the employer convenience doctrine
flunks the external consistency requirement for a properly apportioned tax); Zelinsky,
Coronavirus, supra note 64 (“If the governor won’t stop New York’s irrational income
tax penalty for nonresident telecommuters on the days they work at home, Congress
should.”); see also Bentley, supra note 152, at 1166; Walter Hellerstein, Letter to the
Editor, Nonresident NY Employees Are Not Currently Working at Home for Their
‘Convenience’, STATE TAX NOTES (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.taxnotes.com/featuredanalysis/nonresident-ny-employees-are-not-currently-working-home-their-convenience/
2020/04/02/2cbx8 [https://perma.cc/7MQA-GENL]; William V. Vetter, A Critique of the
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New York upheld this rule as constitutional when taxing 100 percent of
a ten year Tennessee resident who only spent twenty-five percent of his
time in New York; however, in the dissent, it emphasized that the
application of the law had gone too far and is unconstitutional.202
Professor Edward A. Zelinsky at Cardozo Law School, a critic of the
“convenience of the employer” rule, even filed a lawsuit in the early
2000s to challenge the rule. The next Subpart briefly introduces and
discusses this case.
3.

Zelinsky

The facts of Zelinsky are as follows: Professor Zelinsky commuted
three days a week to Cardozo Law School in New York from his home
in Connecticut. When he did not commute to New York, he worked at
his Connecticut home preparing lessons, exams, and conducting
scholarly research and writing.203 When school was not in session and
during the entire 1995 fall semester, Zelinsky worked exclusively from
home.204 However, under the convenience of the employer rule, when
Zelinsky worked from home, his time was counted as if he were
working in New York. This meant that all of his income was considered
to be sourced from New York, which subjected his wages to New York’s
income tax. Due to this, Zelinsky’s income from Cardozo Law School
was taxed twice, once as a resident of Connecticut and a second time
under New York’s convenience of the employer rule.
In Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of the State of New York, Zelinsky
challenged the rule’s broad application of being “in New York” as
unconstitutional because it unnecessarily burdened interstate
commerce, violating the Dormant Commerce Clause.205 He stated that
under the second prong of the Complete Auto test, the tax was not
constitutional and was being unfairly apportioned between New York
and Connecticut.206 Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, a state may
only tax source income earned by nonresidents as long as it taxes its
“fair share of an interstate transaction . . . to ‘minimize the likelihood

Empire State’s “New” Convenience of the Employer Rule, 2007 J. MULTISTATE TAX’N &
INCENTIVES 14, 23.
202 Huckaby v. N.Y. State Div. of Tax Appeals, 829 N.E.2d 276, 285 (N.Y. 2005).
203 Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 801 N.E.2d 840, 843 (N.Y. 2003).
204 Id.
205 See id. at 844-45.
206 Id. at 845. He also challenged the rule under the Due Process Clause, but the
court recognized the minimum connection to New York. Id.
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that an interstate transaction will be improperly burdened by multiple
taxation.’”207
The Court of Appeals of New York found Zelinsky’s case did not
impact interstate commerce and was constitutional. Assessing only the
second prong of the test, the court found this prong was met because,
first, the convenience of the employer rule was internally consistent by
applying the internal consistency test.208 Second, the rule was externally
consistent because it had an “economic justification for the State’s claim
upon the value taxed.”209
In determining that the rule was externally consistent, the Court
adopted the view that because “many busy professionals, at the
conclusion of a full day, routinely bring work home for the evenings or
weekends . . . this work cannot transform employment that takes place
wholly within New York into an interstate business activity subject to
the Commerce Clause.”210 Thus, the work Zelinsky performed at home
equated to bringing work home at the end of a full day, “the
convenience of the employer test neither unfairly burdens interstate
commerce nor discriminates against the free flow of goods in the
marketplace.”211
The Court’s rationale considered Zelinsky’s at-home research,
writing, exam development, and lesson preparation to be in New York
because “all of petitioner’s teaching is accomplished in New York and
his voluntary choice to bring auxiliary work home to Connecticut
cannot transform him into an interstate actor.”212 Treating professors’
scholarly and other non-teaching responsibilities as “auxiliary” and
“ancillary,” draws this professor’s ire, and would draw objections from
many professors. More importantly, the Court’s finding relies on an
unwise policy rationale. Drawing a line between primary and auxiliary
work responsibilities when evaluating the impact of interstate
commerce creates ambiguity and invites additional adjudication. Such
reasoning only opens the possibility for teleworkers to rechallenge the
rule, especially in situations if the tasks performed out-of-state are more
important or essential than those performed at the in-state office. This
creates ambiguity and will be further challenged as many teleworkers,
207 Id. (quoting Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1989) and Tenn. Gas
Pipeline Co. v. Urbach, 750 N.E.2d 52, 58 (2001)).
208 Id.
209 Id. (quoting Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185
(1995)).
210 Id. at 846.
211 Id. at 847.
212 Id.
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in the wake of COVID-19, are doing more than just ancillary work from
home.
Further, the Court continued that even if working from home
impacted interstate commerce, which would implicate the Dormant
Commerce Clause, apportioning Zelinsky’s entire salary to New York
was fair because he receives benefits from New York every day,
including those days working from home, thanks to his employment
opportunity in New York.213 However, this is merely a tautology
because every multistate activity, regardless of whether it impacts
interstate commerce, benefits from the source state thanks to the work
and business opportunity there. The court merely evaded the real issue:
what the fair apportionment of multistate income would be if the
activity impacts interstate commerce. In the end, the court avoided the
real issue leaving unanswered, “when do these types of taxes violate the
constitution?” This may be an area that the Courts are leaving to
Congress to resolve while taxpayers have both unanswered questions
and uncertainty.
Professor Zelinsky has again challenged New York’s convenience of
the employer rule for his 2019 state income tax return.214 If Zelinsky’s
new case works its way through the courts, it may offer yet another
opportunity for the Supreme Court to review the taxation of teleworkers
without the preliminary issues of original jurisdiction and standing, or
temporary nature of the rule.
4.

New Jersey’s Attack Amid COVID-19

Despite this Article’s critical view of New York’s convenience of the
employer rule, plausible arguments could be made to defend it before
COVID-19. One such argument is that the employee, who ultimately
chooses where they will live, was generally expected to work in person
on the business premises. An employee who was telecommuting was
generally doing it for their own convenience and not for the employer’s
necessity.
However, the COVID-19 crisis has changed the analysis and rationale
behind the rule. The State of New York and many of the businesses
therein now encourage, and may even mandate, that employees work
from home.215 Therefore, during the COVID-19 crisis, a good argument

213

Id.
Petition at 4, Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 801 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 2003) (No.
DTA 830517).
215 Zelinsky, Ill-Advised Taxation, supra note 190, at 1003.
214
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can be made that these telecommuters are working at home for the
necessity of the employer rather than for their own convenience.
As a result, New Jersey and other states are attacking New York’s
taxation of nonresident telecommuters arguing that at least during the
duration of the pandemic, New York is disregarding constitutional
limitations by taxing nonresident telecommuters on income earned at
their out-of-state homes during the coronavirus emergency.216
Opponents of New York ask that the state suspend its taxation of
nonresident telecommuters for the days they work from their out-ofstate homes.217
In fact, New Jersey is advancing a bill (S-3064) that directs the state
treasurer to “examine legal efforts to thwart New York from taxing New
Jersey residents from working from home.”218 This bill was passed
unanimously by the New Jersey Senate on October 29, 2020, and is in
the process of becoming law.219 New Jersey would like to analyze the
potential revenue that New Jersey could bring in if it were to collect
those taxes itself.220 New Jersey residents who telecommute to New
York are currently offset by New Jersey with a tax credit to avoid double
taxation.221 This means that New Jersey has been foregoing its revenue
as a credit to its residents due to the New York tax. It is estimated that
before the pandemic over 300,000 New Jersey residents commuted to
New York every day and subsequently paid taxes on income earned
from commuting.222 State Senator Steven Oroho stated that “[i]f New
York were prevented from taxing New Jersey residents who no longer
go to work across the Hudson, we could generate hundreds of millions
— perhaps billions — of dollars for New Jersey.”223
III. IN SUPPORT OF RESIDENCE-BASED TAXATION FOR TELEWORKERS
COVID-19 has exacerbated state battles over teleworker income. The
unfortunate confusion and compliance burdens on teleworkers in this
216

See Zelinsky, Coronavirus, supra note 64, at 1102.
See Zelinsky, Ill-Advised Taxation, supra note 190, at 1003.
218 Sam McQuillan, N.J. Fight Against New York’s Telecommuting Taxes Advances,
BLOOMBERG DAILY TAX REP. (Oct. 22, 2020, 1:46 PM), https://news.bloombergtax.
com/daily-tax-report-state/n-j-fight-against-new-yorks-telecommuting-taxes-advances
[https://perma.cc/NP8X-67C5].
219 NJ S3064, BILL TRACK 50, https://www.billtrack50.com/billdetail/1245262 (last
visited Sept. 8, 2021) [https://perma.cc/RP3F-633H].
220 McQuillan, supra note 218.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id.
217
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country can and should be resolved. Between the source-based taxation
and residence-based taxation of teleworkers’ income, this Article
supports a residence-based taxation system for several reasons.
This Part moves beyond constitutional concerns and reveals the
fundamental problems with source-based taxation that attempts to
maintain the pre-COVID-19 work arrangements. It then explores
important theories that justify a state’s taxing right over its constituents
to show that all theories support residence-based taxation for
teleworkers.
A. Are Pre-COVID Arrangements Still the Status Quo?
Much of the justification for states that promote source-based
taxation, like Massachusetts, is based on the premise that teleworking
is a temporary symptom and reflection of the COVID-19 pandemic.224
Early on, policymakers believed the pandemic and its impact would be
temporary in nature and that life would soon return to normal.225 That
assumption turned out to be incorrect. In fact, cities in America,226
across the globe,227 and corporations from coast-to-coast228 now
recognize that teleworking is no longer a temporary oddity of the

224 See Geoffrey E. Snyder, TIR 20-15: Revised Guidance on the Massachusetts Tax
Implications of an Employee Working Remotely Due to the COVID-19 Pandemic, MASS.GOV
(Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.mass.gov/technical-information-release/tir-20-15-revisedguidance-on-the-massachusetts-tax-implications-of [https://perma.cc/ABZ9-CQT7]
(describing how the tax policy is “temporary” and that is came as a result of the
“temporary social-distancing measures and other restrictions”).
225 John Bacon, Could the Coronavirus Outbreak Be Gone by Summer? What We Don’t
Know Is ‘Epic,’ USA TODAY (Mar. 15, 2020, 1:28 PM ET), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/health/2020/03/15/coronavirus-crisis-end-summer-experts-odds-what-wedont-know-epic/5053876002/ [https://perma.cc/F6DU-E2FX] (citing a “member of the
World Health Organization’s executive council” and “Italian health ministry
consultant” that said “life could return to ‘normal’ this summer [2020]”).
226 Jared Lindzon, Cities Offer Cash as They Compete for New Residents Amid Remote
Work Boom, FAST CO. (June 22, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90517270/citiesoffer-cash-as-they-compete-for-new-residents-amid-remote-work-boom [https://perma.cc/
J9UA-SHBU].
227 E.g., Tim Lai, Finland’s Attractive Enticement for U.S. Workers, FORBES (Nov. 9,
2020, 3:52 PM EST), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timlai/2020/11/09/finlandsattractive-enticement-for-us-tech-workers/?sh=49745cb6481f [https://perma.cc/65D2U93V].
228 Henry, Every Company Going Remote Permanently: Aug 13, 2021 Update, BUILD
REMOTE (Aug. 3, 2021), https://buildremote.co/companies/companies-going-remotepermanently/ [https://perma.cc/8659-GEMH] (noting sixty-five large companies that
are going remote permanently, including Google, Salesforce, State Farm, Microsoft and
Coca-Cola India, among many others).
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pandemic but is the new normal for how Americans choose where to
live and work.
Though there may have been a point where scholars and tax
authorities realistically believed mass teleworking was temporary, it
seems clear now that mass teleworking will be the new normal for
millions of Americans. As such, the taxing principles for individual
income tax should reflect the new status quo and allow states where
individuals choose to live and work to be the source state for taxation
purposes. This is the best position moving forward because: (1) this
“temporary” work environment has no end in sight; (2) extending
Massachusetts’ 2020 “temporary” tax order into 2021 likely lacks a
statutory basis and continues to lose its legitimacy the longer the state’s
“temporary” emergency order remains in place; and (3) not applying
residence-based taxation for teleworking income ignores the evolution
and inevitable development of post-COVID commerce by taxing
employees as if they still work in a pre-COVID world.
1.

Teleworking Is No Longer Temporary

When the COVID-19 pandemic started, there was a general belief that
things would return to normal after a few months.229 Once normal,
teleworkers who had left their work-states would justifiably be taxed as
before by the temporary emergency orders enacted merely to maintain
the status quo. But the old normal has yet to return. The effects of the
pandemic continue in many parts of the United States,230 and while
some sections of the economy are returning to work, many work
environments are permanently shifting to remote models231
Because millions of Americans are shifting to more permanent remote
work, the United States is seeing a nationwide migration as residents
choose to live in and work in states that better reflect their lifestyles,232
229 Shawn Plank, Will We Ever Get ‘Back to Normal’ After COVID-19?, DES MOINES
REG. (Dec. 1, 2020, 8:52 AM CT), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/
columnists/iowa-view/2020/12/01/after-covid-19-we-ever-really-get-back-normal/
6468744002/ [https://perma.cc/MAZ2-J5HT] (describing the position of millions of
Americans who believed the social distancing guidelines would operate for several
months, but then life would go back to normal).
230 See Amanda Morris, Families of High-Risk Children Despair Over Covid Resurgence,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/09/us/high-riskchildren-covid.html [https://perma.cc/A55N-S9DA] (indicating that the Delta variant
has led to increased COVID-19 cases throughout the United States).
231 Henry, supra note 228.
232 Anne Kadet, Manhattan Couple Ditch Apartment, Buy RV. Was It Worth It?, WALL
ST. J. (Feb. 16, 2021, 10:00 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/manhattan-coupleditch-apartment-buy-rv-was-it-worth-it-11613487600 [https://perma.cc/6JJ4-NSCV]
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or that have a lower cost-of-living.233 Companies are aware of this
change and are instituting permanent policies allowing workers to
choose whether they want to work in an office or work from home.234
Indeed, some companies have benefited so much from teleworking,
they are choosing to permanently reduce their office space consumption
by up to 100 percent.235
The new normal manifesting from the “temporary” teleworking
phenomena is not just affecting our workplaces, but it is shifting the
fabric of our schools,236 the political make-up of the states,237 and even
the family and home structure.238 Some scholars believe the impact of
COVID-19 may be the most significant economic and cultural impact
since the “oil shock and energy crisis during the 1970s and early
1980s.”239 As such, American culture and society are shifting to adapt.
However, one of the few segments of American society to resist the new
status quo is the unique relationship between state tax policy and the
taxation of teleworker income.
For states to be the source tax state teleworkers who neither live in
nor work in their states, the best argument to justify the lack of tax
nexus is that the 2020 teleworking phenomena is temporary. After all,
if things are temporary, then those teleworkers would likely return to
(describing how a couple started living cross-country in an RV instead of in their highrent home in New York because of the pandemic and flexible teleworking).
233 Hugh Son, Leaving New York: High Earners in Finance and Tech Explain Why They
Left the ‘World’s Greatest City’, CNBC (Oct. 31, 2020, 10:53 AM EDT),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/31/why-high-earners-in-finance-and-tech-left-newyork-city.html [https://perma.cc/6V7M-X32T].
234 See Henry, supra note 228.
235 Jackie Crosby, Why Some Minnesota Companies Are Ditching the Office and Going
Remote, Forever, STARTRIBUNE (Jan. 30, 2021, 2:39 PM), https://www.startribune.com/
why-some-minnesota-companies-are-ditching-the-office-and-going-remote-forever/
600017018/ [https://perma.cc/9RHK-TGVV].
236 Mark Sheehan, Families Move to Get Their Kids the Ultimate Education: An InPerson One, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.csmonitor.com/
USA/Education/2020/1118/Families-move-to-get-their-kids-the-ultimate-education-an-inperson-one [https://perma.cc/5GYM-AZTT] (describing family that moved from
California to Utah so their kids could get in-person learning).
237 Sarah Holder, Is the ‘California Exodus’ Turning Arizona Blue?, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB
(Nov. 2, 2020, 2:43 PM PST), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-1102/how-covid-migration-may-change-the-political-map [https://perma.cc/LZ5R-TU5U].
238 Peggy
Spear, Pandemic Changing Family Dynamics, THE PIONEER,
https://pioneerpublishers.com/pandemic-changing-family-dynamics/ (last visited July
25, 2021) [https://perma.cc/R74Y-VZCM].
239 Covid-19’s Historic Economic Impact, in the U.S. and Abroad, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV.:
HUB (Apr. 16, 2020), https://hub.jhu.edu/2020/04/16/coronavirus-impact-on-europeanamerican-economies/ [https://perma.cc/3B6Y-WTD9].
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the source state soon. But for things to be temporary, there must be an
end in sight.240 And the end of teleworking is nowhere in sight.
Instead, COVID-19 has permanently altered the American working
system and our tax structure. Each state is experiencing this differently.
States like New York are experiencing a severe drop in residents as
workers seek larger homes, more flexible lifestyles, and locations where
the expected timeline for recovery from the pandemic is not as long.241
Other states like Utah are experiencing a surge in residents, and the
shock the local economy felt from the pandemic is quickly fading.242
But even as the effects of the pandemic begin to end in some states,
those states’ workplaces are not returning to pre-COVID work
environments. Rather, they are adapting to the post-COVID
expectations of workers and companies — those expectations being that
workers should be able to work for their employers where they like and
companies should be able to reduce their overhead by reducing office
space.243 Therefore, teleworking is better viewed as an adaption for
larger, more flexible, and more effective business, and not as a
temporary solution to weather COVID-19. Teleworking is the new
normal for American business. The nation’s tax law should reflect that
fact by allowing the states where teleworkers live and work to be their
primary tax state.

240 Temporary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
temporary (last visited Aug. 8, 2021) [https://perma.cc/7F3D-E29A] (defining
“temporary” as “lasting for a limited time”).
241 Anna Bahney, Lots of People Moved Out of New York and California in 2020. Here’s
Where They Went, CNN BUS. (Feb. 1, 2021, 2:10 PM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2021/
02/01/success/new-york-california-exodus-2020-pandemic/index.html [https://perma.cc/
M2KH-RCMA]; see also Patrick McGeehan, Why N.Y.C.’s Economic Recovery May Lag the
Rest of the Country’s, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/10/26/nyregion/nyc-unemployment.html [https://perma.cc/9RXN-23HJ] (estimating
that New York’s recovery will last two years longer than the rest of the country).
242 Two Utah Cities Identified as Being Best Poised to Recover From COVID-19, UTAH
GOVERNOR’S OFF. ECON. OPPORTUNITY (May 15, 2020), https://business.utah.gov/
news/two-utah-cities-identified-as-being-best-poised-to-recover-from-covid-19/
[https://perma.cc/F9NM-2SGW] (noting how Provo and Salt Lake City are two cities
expected to have strong recovery post-pandemic).
243 See MCKINSEY, THE FUTURE OF WORK AFTER COVID-19, at 37 (2021),
https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-of-work/the-future-of-work-aftercovid-19 [https://perma.cc/FJA2-K6S5]; Bryan Robinson, Future of Work: What the PostPandemic Workplace Holds for Remote Workers’ Careers, FORBES (May 2, 2021),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bryanrobinson/2021/05/02/future-of-work-what-the-postpandemic-workplace-holds-for-remote-workers-careers/?sh=619690ab7f5b [https://perma.
cc/HB9W-6NX6].
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The Unpersuasive Extension

Massachusetts’ emergency tax order was termed as temporary and
was scheduled to end at the end of 2020, or “until the state of emergency
expires.”244 However, the state did not end the state of emergency for
more than sixteen months after March 10, 2020, when the “temporary”
tax order first took effect. On June 15, 2021, Massachusetts finally
ended its state of emergency — conveniently right before the Supreme
Court decision on New Hampshire.245 Still, for over sixteen months,
Massachusetts had taxed nonresident teleworkers who received no
support, benefit, or representation from Massachusetts’ government.246
Massachusetts’ position is already subject to scrutiny. Extending the
taxation of teleworkers beyond 2020 and for more than sixteen months
stretches what already likely surpasses Massachusetts’ taxing authority.
As discussed above, the very premise of “temporary” is that there would
be an end date — it has been over sixteen months since Massachusetts
extended its state of emergency, and it seems likely to continue for
much of 2021. As of August 2021, the United States has entered the
fourth wave of the pandemic,247 and it might not be surprising if
Massachusetts reinstates the emergency tax rule. As this continues, at
some point the executive order may shift from a temporary edict to
simply a permanent executive order taxing workers who neither work
in, live in, or even visit, the state. This was all instituted on the basis
that teleworkers worked in Massachusetts at one point (but no longer).
The tenuous authority Massachusetts relies on to be the source taxing
state on individuals who have an almost non-existent connection
weakens the longer the pandemic continues.

244 Elaine S. Povich, Remote Work Boom Complicates State Income Taxes, PEW (Oct.
2, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2020/10/
02/remote-work-boom-complicates-state-income-taxes [https://perma.cc/969N-ESLG].
245 Mass. COVID-19 Order No. 69, supra note 163 (indicating the COVID-19 state
of emergency was terminated on June 15, 2021).
246 Abraham Gross, Mass. Agency Says Teleworkers Must Source Income to State,
LAW360 (Feb. 12, 2021, 12:54 PM EST), https://www.law360.com/tax-authority/
articles/1354869/mass-agency-says-teleworkers-must-source-income-to-state
[https://perma.cc/9MFK-SU8D].
247 Karen Weintraub, The Fourth Wave of COVID-19 Cases Is Here. Will We Escape
the UK’s Fate? It’s Too Soon to Know, USA TODAY (July 16, 2021, 1:20 PM ET),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2021/07/16/covid-19-fourth-wave-pandemicsurge-deaths-hospitalizations/7976034002/ [https://perma.cc/A9H6-7HVW].
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B. A Solution for the Future
Teleworking is only likely to increase in the future, not decrease.
Taxing remote workers as if they live and work in states they neither
live nor work in impedes interstate commerce and extends a state’s
taxing authority well beyond traditional tax law parameters. Continuing
this type of taxation lacks meaning for personal income tax, and,
through increased complications tied to filing taxes in source states,
likely reduces compliance.248 Alternatively, taxing teleworkers in the
state they reside where they can see their tax dollars at work, may
positively effect compliance.
1.

People as Physical Being in the Digital Economy

Since the COVID pandemic, sixty-six percent of Americans telework
at least part time and forty-four percent telework five days a week.249
This trend seems likely to continue for many types of businesses that
have no need for a physical workspace, including specialty service
professions like legal or accounting services, customer service,
technology, and other businesses representing tens of millions of
working Americans. As teleworking continues to develop, eventually
the question of whether there is a sufficient nexus for taxation will
become increasingly muddy. To avoid confusion, the most meaningful
way to determine a taxpayer’s individual income tax nexus should be
the teleworker’s residence. The alternative, taxing an individual’s
income based on the location of the business and where the employee
“works,” is subject to manipulation,250 can constantly trigger Dormant
Commerce Clause concerns, and seems to lack the due process required
under the Constitution.251

248 See, e.g., Holderness, supra note 158, at 5 (arguing for considering compliance
burden when determining Dormant Commerce Clause nexus requirement).
249 66% of U.S. Employees Are Working Remotely at Least Part-Time During the
COVID-19 Pandemic, CISION (Apr. 16, 2020, 7:53 ET), https://www.prnewswire.com/
news-releases/66-of-us-employees-are-working-remotely-at-least-part-time-during-thecovid-19-pandemic-301041859.html [https://perma.cc/HE82-KNRC].
250 E.g., Chris Mathews, California Invasion: Houston Sees Big Business Gains from
Coastal Corporate Exodus, HOUS. BUS. J. (Feb. 12, 2021, 6:00 AM EST),
https://www.bizjournals.com/houston/news/2021/02/12/houston-sees-big-gains-fromcalifornia-exodus.html [https://perma.cc/73E8-LFUF] (discussing the example of HP
moving headquarters to Houston, TX while maintaining their operations in California,
but still being able to shift some of their tax burden from California’s twenty-eight
percent rate to Texas’s twenty-one percent corporate rate).
251 See supra Part II.A.
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Hence, this Article supports residence-based taxation for teleworkers’
income. It is worth emphasizing that this position does not make the
argument that 100 percent of teleworkers’ income should always be
taxed by the residence state. Workers’ income earned by remote work
should be taxed by the residence state, whereas income earned by
(physical) commute should be taxed by the source state provided that
the number of days working in the source state exceeds certain
thresholds. Considering that many teleworkers may have a hybrid
arrangement — sometimes they commute, and sometimes they work
from home — income from the former would be taxed by the source
state and income from the latter would be taxed by the residence state.
This has been the norm of state income tax law since before the
pandemic, except in those states with the convenience of the employer
rule. This norm is likely more reasonable than the Massachusetts’
pandemic tax rule and the convenience of the employer rule, because it
apportions the tax base of teleworkers’ and hybrid-workers’ income
more fairly between source and residence states.
This argument regards the physical presence of individual workers as
an important factor to decide which state ought to tax their income. A
potential pushback might arise if one considers the recent development
in Wayfair, where the Supreme Court held that physical presence is no
longer required for the substantial nexus prong in the Complete Auto
test.252 Instead, a substantial economic nexus would be sufficient to
require remote venders to collect sales tax on behalf of the state.
However, this Article believes that interpreting Wayfair in such a
fashion that limits the residence-based taxation of individuals’ income
is flawed for the following reasons.253
First, physical presence is important for individuals, as opposed to
business entities, and perhaps even more meaningful for natural persons
as the economy is digitalized and goes virtual. The author agrees that
the physical presence requirement for business taxation is outdated in
the digitalized economy.254 Worse, the physical presence or residence
252

See supra note 158.
See, e.g., Zelinsky, Current Status, supra note 159, at 3-4 (“Wayfair does not hold
that physical presence (or its absence) is never relevant under the Due Process and
Commerce Clauses. In the context of nonresident telecommuting employees, it is.”).
254 See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), OECD/G20 BASE
EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT: STATEMENT ON A TWO-PILLAR SOLUTION TO
ADDRESS THE TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY
(2021), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/statement-on-a-two-pillar-solution-to-addressthe-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy-july-2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H4A9-VKR4] [hereinafter OECD/G20, TWO-PILLAR] (agreement to
abandon physical presence requirement for international corporate income tax); Young
253
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of a business is easy to manipulate and has been susceptible to
aggressive tax planning of multinational enterprises in international
tax.255 In that context, the critique’s reading of Wayfair is agreeable.
However, people are physical; companies are not. In the digital world,
the workplace of businesses and natural persons may vary, and even be
virtual; but human beings always have a physical presence in a certain
space. So, it is reasonable for physical presence to count more for
natural persons. Because of such differences, the author supports a twotrack approach to international tax: residence-based taxation for
individuals and source-based taxation for businesses.256
To demonstrate the author’s position in the teleworkers’ multistate
income tax, this Article supports the residence-based taxation for
individuals, as opposed to businesses, especially the nonresident
individuals of the source state. The nonresidents’ income earned while
physically present in the source state still ought to be taxed by the source
state. However, extending the source taxation for nonresidents’ remote
work would be overreaching.
Second, the issue of the physical presence requirement in Wayfair was
about the tax nexus — that is, a minimum threshold question. However,
states can set stricter requirements to establish source- or residencebased taxation. Even Wayfair admitted those additional requirements
for source taxation, such as certain amount of revenue and/or certain
number of transactions in a source state for imposing collection
obligation of sales tax to remove venders. International tax has a similar
norm and developments. Currently, global leaders are negotiating a new
international tax system to remove physical presence requirement for
business taxation; instead, it sets other requirements for source-based
taxation, such as global and local revenue thresholds, profits threshold,
and revenue allocation formulae between source and residence

Ran (Christine) Kim, Digital Services Tax: A Cross-border Variation of the Consumption
Tax Debate, 72 ALA. L. REV. 131, 133 (2020) (arguing conventional rules about physical
presence do not work effectively in the new digital economy).
255 See, e.g., Omri Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1613
(2013) (explaining that corporate tax residence is meaningless and proposing a
functional approach to find proper jurisdiction to tax corporations’ income).
256 See, e.g., Young Ran (Christine) Kim, Considering “Citizenship Taxation”: In
Defense of FATCA, 20 FLA. TAX REV. 335 (2017) [hereinafter Considering Citizenship
Taxation] (endorsing citizenship taxation as a variation of residence-based taxation for
individual income tax); Young Ran (Christine) Kim, Carried Interest and Beyond: The
Nature of Private Equity Investment and Its International Tax Implications, 37 VA. TAX REV.
421 (2018) (supporting source-based taxation for business profits earned by passthrough business entities).
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countries.257 Applying it to teleworkers’ income, the source state may
have minimum nexus for remote workers’ income. However, that may
not be sufficient to justify any kind of source-based taxation of remote
workers’ income that does not involve revenue split between source and
residence states. Wayfair does prevent a policy that this Article proposes
— that is, a source state may need to establish requirements other than
the minimum nexus, such as certain number of days working in state.
2.

Teleworkers and the Modern Tiebout Model

Taxing teleworkers’ individual incomes based on where they live and
work reflects not just the reality of the situation, it also honors the
choice of individual taxpayers. For example, Chris who chooses to live
and work in Utah when his employer is based in San Francisco may do
so because Chris enjoys Utah’s weather, its outdoor recreational
activities, being closer to family, or other reasons. But whatever the
reason, allowing Chris’s income to be taxed by Utah as the residence
state best reflects the taxpayer’s personal choice. Indeed, that choice by
the teleworker to avail himself of the benefits of Utah vests Utah with
the strongest claim to tax that teleworker. So long as a teleworker
chooses to derive social benefits from one state, that state should be
entitled to derive revenue from that teleworker.
In the same vein, taxing teleworkers based on their choice of
residence may also be prudent tax policy. Research done in 2014
suggests that a taxpayer’s ability to demonstrate preference on
government spending increases tax compliance.258 So, just as providing
taxpayers more agency through “eliciting tax spending preferences”
might be an effective tool in helping taxpayers to better understand the
services they receive from the government and further engage them
from being “passive” taxpayers to engaged citizens, so also perhaps
could engaging the taxpayer’s agency in allowing their tax consequences
reflect their choice of residence.259 In turn, this could increase tax
compliance. To be sure, tax compliance is influenced by numerous
factors.260 But implementing a policy that better allows teleworkers to
257 See, e.g., OECD/G20, TWO-PILLAR, supra note 254 (addressing tax challenges
arising from the digitalization of the economy).
258 Cait Lamberton, Jan-Emmanuel De Neve & Michael I. Norton, Eliciting Taxpayer
Preferences Increases Tax Compliance 6-10 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-106,
2014).
259 Id. at 2-3.
260 Id. at 3 (listing some factors like “trust in government and tax fairness, tax code
uncertainty, taxpayer socio-demographics, and numerous cultural and normative
factors”).
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demonstrate their preference on how they are taxed by choosing to live
in their community would likely increase tax compliance more than a
system where the teleworker’s funds go out of their resident state to a
state they neither live no work in. Recognizing that many taxpayers are
likely frustrated already with nonresident states taxing their income
when they have no physical presence there, this proposed policy could
well increase compliance.
Teleworkers’ frustration regarding nonresident taxation is not just
limited to having a voice in taxpayer agency and freedom of choice;
taxed teleworkers are generally subject to increased taxation and
potential double taxation as demonstrated in the example relating to
Chris. States that fight to maintain the pre-pandemic work
arrangements as the status quo are essentially maintaining the double
and over-taxation of interstate, telecommuter income. Unless
telecommuters are taxed on a uniform basis throughout the United
States, double and over-taxation issues will remain.
The increasing trend of teleworking sheds new light on the merits of
the Tiebout Model in the digitalized economy. The Tiebout Model
emphasizes the right of voice and exit to the individuals when choosing
their community.261 If municipalities offer public goods and services at
different prices — that is, tax rates — people with different valuations
for those goods and services would choose a community that maximizes
their personal utility. Thus, tax competition among municipalities
would enhance the efficiency of allocating public goods and population.
However, the Tiebout Model does not fully explain the benefits of
metropolitan areas.262 People are willing to pay expensive rent and high
income taxes to live near Manhattan or in the Bay Area. New Hampshire
residents commuting to Boston are also clustered near Massachusetts.
That is because such agglomeration provides huge benefits in terms of
job opportunities, higher compensation, advanced skills, networking,
and so on. Emphasizing people’s choice under the Tiebout Model and
the residence-based taxation for teleworkers’ income does not fully
appreciate the benefits of agglomeration, and thus is less convincing
under agglomeration economics.
The above is true, or at least it was before the pandemic, when typical
teleworking would have been done at home in the metropolitan area.
However, teleworking since the pandemic shows a new pattern. People
261 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,
419 (1956).
262 See, e.g., Shanske, supra note 158 (noting more, but not necessarily most,
individuals and firms learned they can relocate with the help of modern technology to
find optimal tax and public services packages).

1212

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 55:1149

like Chris have not teleworked in their apartment in the Bay Area, but
rather moved to Utah or Florida. The agglomeration economics that
supports source states’ position loses its strength under this new trend.
Instead, the Tiebout Model that values the individuals’ choice is worth
revisiting under post-pandemic patterns.
In a similar vein, the remote work revolution offers the chance for
“economic dynamism.”263 For one, it tasks states to adapt their tax
systems to the evolving work landscape. Employees now recognize that
to be successful in a major tech career, an individual no longer needs to
live in San Francisco. This recognition is extending beyond the idea that
only tech-based jobs align with telecommuting. Many fields are
recognizing adaptability to telecommuting. Employees realize they can
work from a home office in Duluth, Minnesota or Wauchula, Florida,
provided there is an internet connection. So, failure by a state to
experiment and evolve along with the nature of work will have fiscal
consequences.
In response, some States will lose income tax revenue while others
will gain it. An additional silver lining of the COVID-19 pandemic is
that it has enabled high-income earners from major metropolitan areas
and cities to move and work remotely in more rural settings. This has
the potential to stimulate these more rural settings with increased
income tax revenues and give them new fiscal possibilities.
C. Tax Nexus Theories Support Residence-Based Taxation for
Teleworkers
Next, consider the taxation of teleworkers based on theories. While a
state may declare sovereignty and argue that this implies the power to
tax its constituents, the state must also “offer some prior normative
justification for claiming those it seeks to regulate through taxation.”264
This Subpart analyzes three representative theories on the justification
of states’ taxing right, or tax nexus: (1) consent theory (or vote with
your feet theory); (2) benefits theory; and (3) social obligation theory.
Applying those theories to teleworking offers insights on which state,
between source and residence states, ought to exercise primary taxing
right on teleworkers’ incomes.
263 Brief of Amicus Curiae The Buckeye Institute in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for
Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 21, New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, 141 S. Ct. 1262
(2020) (No. 22O154).
264 Allison Christians, Human Rights at the Borders of Tax Sovereignty 11 (N.Y.U.,
Working Draft, 2017), https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/
Allison%20Christians.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7E2-GN4A].
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Consent Theory: Vote with Your Feet

The consent theory is often described as “vote by feet.”265 This idea is
centered around the concept of a democracy.266 A democracy is
“modeled primarily on membership combined with empowered
voice.”267 Members of a democracy appoint representatives “to work out
the details of democracy because people are too busy earning a living
and dealing with their own problems to actively participate in the
government.”268 Thus, because the people have voices and ultimately
determine the level of taxes through their appointed representatives, a
state is justified in taxing its residents.
Dissatisfied members may choose to “exit” collectivity as an
alternative rather than seeking to reform or respond by voicing their
dissatisfaction.269 Therefore, individuals who purposefully choose to
reside in a specific state are voting with their feet regarding that
sovereignty’s powers, including the right to tax. In essence, they are
entering into an implied contract with the state they reside in. If a
resident is dissatisfied with the state’s powers, including that right to
tax, the dissatisfied resident may choose to exit the state. Professor
Hirschman describes this “voice” and “exit” concept as a “taxpayers’
ability to resist taxation through the political process of the taxing state
and to depart the taxing state for a more favorable tax environment.”270
There are some criticisms of the consent theory. First, the implied
contract as part of a democracy can be questioned because a
democracy’s voice only follows the majority’s opinion and does not
necessarily consider minority views.271 Thus, the consent theory may
lack merit because there is no real consent from all residents for a
certain level of taxation.

265 Mark E. Warren, Voting with Your Feet: Exit-based Empowerment in Democratic
Theory, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 683, 683 (2011).
266 In this context, this theory is different from the Tiebout Model that seeks
equilibrium provision of public goods and services and efficient allocation of
population.
267 Warren, supra note 265.
268 Robert W. McGee, Three Views on the Ethics of Tax Evasion, 67 J. BUS. ETHICS 15,
17 (2006).
269 See Warren, supra note 265.
270 Edward A. Zelinsky, Rethinking Tax Nexus and Apportionment: Voice, Exit, and the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 28 VA. TAX REV. 1, 3 (2008) (stating “Professor Hirschman
famously called the ‘voice’ and ‘exit’ options, i.e., taxpayers’ ability to resist taxation
through the political process of the taxing state and to depart the taxing state for a more
favorable tax environment”).
271 McGee, supra note 268, at 21.
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Ruth Mason addresses this criticism by finding that for the consent
theory to have real merit, two conditions must be present: (1) “the
governed person must understand that continued residence means
consent” and (2) “she must have a genuine alternative to remaining.”272
Thus, if the governed resident, even if having a minority opinion,
understands that continued residence in the state is implied consent to
be subject to the majority’s decision of the level of taxation, then the
first criticism of the consent theory regarding minorities lack of consent
becomes less convincing. By remaining in the state or voting with their
feet, a minority group is practically consenting to follow the majority’s
decision. The benefit of having a democracy is that in return, the
minority taxpayer has the opportunity to advance their opinion on a
certain matter in the next election.
As to Mason’s second point, some might argue that “even if it is
theoretically possible to move” to another state, “it may not be
practically possible or feasible” to do so because there are many barriers
to freedom of movement.273 However, if it can be found that the barriers
to the movement of a resident are insufficient to prevent the finding of
a genuine alternative to remaining, then the second criticism about the
impracticability of the exit option fails as well. Teleworking is a good
example of people seeking an alternative to remaining.
Another criticism of the consent theory is from the perspective of
anarchists, arguing that future generations cannot be bound to the
implied contract made by the original generation.274 Anarchists may
argue that “laws, once passed, remain binding on all who live within the
jurisdiction as long as the law exists” and “governments are like
corporations” where they “continue to exist independently of their
owners.”275 However, Thomas Jefferson responded to this, stating “[w]e
may consider each generation as a distinct nation, with a right, by the
will of its majority, to bind themselves, but none to bind the succeeding
generation, more than the inhabitants of another country.”276 Some
argue that Jefferson believed “laws have a natural expiration date as
members of the generation who were of the age of majority when the
law was passed start to die” and “one generation cannot bind another

272

Ruth Mason, Citizenship Taxation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 169, 188 (2016).
McGee, supra note 268, at 18.
274 Id. at 21-22.
275 Id. at 22.
276 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Wayles Eppes (June 24, 1813),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-06-02-0200 [https://perma.cc/
Y6HW-UNFW].
273
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generation.”277 Inspired by Jefferson’s position, it would make more
sense to understand that each generation renews their implied contract
with the government by voting with their feet through continued
residence in the state and by electing the next generation of
representatives.
How can the consent theory justify taxation in the realm of
teleworking? Put differently, in Chris’s example, which state between
Utah or California ought to have the primary power to tax Chris?
Consent theory would support residence-based taxation rather than
source-based taxation. When Chris relocated from California to Utah,
Chris has consented to be taxed according to the laws of Utah by voting
with his feet.
In Sam’s example, there is an explicit or implied contract between
New Hampshire and Sam on New Hampshire’s taxing right. Sam has
not consented through “vote by feet” to be taxed by Massachusetts by
locating her residence in New Hampshire rather than Massachusetts.
Moreover, there is no implied consent by Sam about Massachusetts’
attempt to project extraterritorial taxing right to her as a telecommuter.
Hence, consent theory would uphold the residence-based taxation of
teleworkers.
2.

Benefits Theory

Under the benefits theory recognized by the Supreme Court in Cook
v. Tait,278 individuals who enjoy the benefits provided by the taxing
government should “bear the corresponding burdens — in particular,
the payment of taxes.”279 Michael Kirsch notes at least four benefits that
justify a state’s taxation of a resident: personal protection, property
protection, the right to vote, and the right to enter the state.280 First,
individuals often rely upon governments for personal protection,
particularly in times of crisis. Second, individuals benefit from “the
protection of personal property . . .” provided by the government.281
Third, individuals benefit from the right to vote.282 Fourth, individuals
benefit from the ability to enter the territory “at any time.”283 In sum,
277

McGee, supra note 268, at 22.
265 U.S. 47 (1924).
279 Michael Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 470
(2007).
280 Id. at 470-76.
281 Id. at 473.
282 Id. at 474-76.
283 Id. at 476.
278
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governments are justified in taxing individuals when those
governments provide benefits to the taxed individuals — whether
through protection, civil liberties, or other benefits.
However, as a theory, the benefits theory has been criticized from
modern welfarism because the relationship between government
benefits and taxation is more than a mere matter of quid pro quo.284
Modern income taxes calculate the amount of tax by the taxpayers’
ability to pay, not by the benefits they receive.285 As Edward Zelinsky
notes, “minimal benefits do not justify maximal taxation.”286 With this
regard, the social obligation theory below accords better to the modern
welfare state.
Nonetheless, benefits theory is the most intuitively appealing to
explain the government’s taxing right over constituents. Coming back
to the example of teleworkers: under the benefits theory, which states
have justification to tax teleworkers? Extrapolating from the crux of the
theory, individual income taxes should focus on the physical presence
or residence, and not source-based taxation because the physical
presence of individuals indicates the locale in which they benefit from
government services.
In Chris’s example, Utah is justified to tax Chris. Chris lives in Utah
and works from home for a business in California — he derives far more
benefit from the government in Utah than in California. If Chris were
to be confronted by danger, emergency services from Utah would be
provided. If Chris were to go to their local park, the park would be
maintained by Utah’s government; so too would be the roads near
Chris’s home; Chris’s utilities are provided for by Utah; public
education for Chris’s children is largely run by Utah. Contrastingly,
Chris derives little benefit from California. Although Chris works for a
business located in California, Chris benefits little from the state outside
of being employed in it. Therefore, if the government of Utah provides
a majority of the services enjoyed by Chris, then Utah is justified to tax
Chris, and Chris in return has a duty to contribute taxes to Utah that
provides benefits to him and his community.
Sam’s example is even more salient because New Hampshire (not
Massachusetts) provides benefits of medical services, among others, in
the difficult time when Sam tested positive. Therefore, like the consent
theory, the benefit theory supports residence-based taxation for
teleworkers.
284

Kim, Considering Citizenship Taxation, supra note 256, at 338.
Mason, supra note 272, at 196.
286 Edward A. Zelinsky, Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation: Citizenship as an
Administrable Proxy for Domicile, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1289, 1309 (2011).
285
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Social Obligation Theory

The social obligation theory justifies a state’s taxing right over its
constituents because members of society have social obligations to
support those in their society.287 This theory is built upon the moralphilosophical idea that “people have a moral obligation to support
fellow members of their own society.”288 Members of society only have
social obligations to other members in their community and do not have
social obligations to support people everywhere.289 Thus, under this
theory, a government is justified in taxing individuals who belong to
the jurisdiction’s community, and correspondingly individual members
of the community have obligations to pay taxes to the government
supporting the community.
The question may arise whether residence is a good predictor of one’s
community.290 As much as the social obligation theory is based on moral
philosophy, it can also be criticized from a moral philosophical
perspective.291 Social obligation theory hinges on the idea that there is
a general obligation to obey the government’s laws for the social good.292
While there may be a social obligation under normal circumstances,
what if the community at issue is corrupt or involved in ethically and
morally bad behaviors? Can taxation still be justified? Consider a Jewish
community in Germany during World War II. It would be hard to argue
that “Jews have an obligation to obey all the laws of the country, and to
pay all the taxes they legally owe, if Hitler were the tax collector.”293
Nor since, during that time, no other German taxpayers would have
owed any obligations to Jews. For those reasons, it would be
problematic to consider the Jews’ residence as their community for the
basis of their tax nexus. The point of this criticism is that the residence
proxy for community standard may have issues when governments are
discriminating against a certain group of residents in the state.
Nevertheless, while residence is not a perfect proxy for community,
residence is generally where most people consider their community to
be. Using residence to predict community is practical and
administratively feasible. More importantly, when applying social
obligation theory to the world of teleworking, it is obvious which state
287
288
289
290
291
292
293

Mason, supra note 272, at 196-97.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 211.
See McGee, supra note 268, at 17.
See id. at 18.
Id.
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between residence and source states individuals would consider the
community to which they belong. The idea of a community
encompasses much more than employment — it includes culture,
customs, norms, values, all often located within a geographic area. So,
an individual who works from home for a company located in a different
state often belongs to the community where they live, not where they
work.294 As such, the social obligation theory supports residence-based
taxation over source-based taxation.
IV. FEDERALISM AND A CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTION
To offer a standardized and harmonized solution for the taxation of
the multistate income of teleworkers, Congress should create federal
law that enforces a residence-based approach for teleworking. This Part
demonstrates that Congress maintains broad power to preempt state tax
laws that currently prevent residence states from taxing teleworkers
who live in their state.
A. A Congressional Solution for the Interstate Commerce Tax Problem
When it comes to conflicts with taxing multistate income, Congress
has been notoriously passive in exercising their constitutional power,
generally neglecting to offer a harmonized solution.295 Instead, the
Supreme Court has created and relied on various jurisprudence on the
issue based mainly on the Dormant Commerce Clause and Due Process
Clause as a stop-gap until Congress decides to enact national
legislation.296 However, the judicial solutions are inherently limited
because the Court can only invalidate unconstitutional state tax rules
and is incapable of reconciling the states’ competing interests.297 Many
Justices over the years, including Justices Black, Frankfurter, and
Douglas, have expressed views in dissenting opinions to leave the tax at
issue for the consideration of Congress, allowing them to create a
concrete solution because exploring “the problem of the taxing freedom
294 Some may argue that in Sam’s example, at least part of Sam’s community should
be considered to be in Massachusetts, depending on the amount of time spent
teleworking to Massachusetts and the degree of interactions with other Massachusetts
residents. However, remote relationships through teleworking can be viewed as
superficial when compared to those face-to-face relationships that Sam likely has with
other New Hampshire residents.
295 HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 214.
296 Id.
297 See Thomas R. Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing
Powers of the States, 31 HARV. L. REV. 321, 324-26 (1918).
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of the States and the needed limits on such state taxing power” is
Congress’ job.298
Despite the increasing number of teleworkers who are puzzled with
their multistate income tax, there is no official guidance by the federal
government on the matter. As discussed in Part I.C, only a quarter of
the states have issued tax guidance, raising the prospect of double
taxation for some teleworkers because states are taking different and
conflicting positions on how the worker’s incomes displaced by the
pandemic should be taxed.
The multistate tax obligations associated with working, even
temporarily, in another state have long been a point of contention. Long
pending federal legislation, called the bipartisan Mobile Workforce
State Income Tax Simplification Act, would establish a uniform thirtyday threshold before employees are required to comply with the income
taxes of a state other than their state of residence.299 But for now, that is
not the law — yet many employees are working in another state for
extended periods.
Recognizing the need for federal preemption, the Senate offered a
solution (Remote and Mobile Worker Relief Act, S. 3995) as a part of
the pandemic relief package in August 2020;300 this was later
reintroduced in April 2021 (S. 1274).301 The solution that emerged in
the Senate is a pandemic-specific version of a bipartisan mobile
workforce relief measure that Sens. John Thune (R-S.D.) and Sherrod
Brown (D-Ohio) have promoted for several years.302 Key features
298 Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 476 (1959)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The problem calls for solution by devising a congressional
policy.”); see also McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 183-84 (1940)
(Black, J., dissenting) (discussing the power of Congress to legislate in the area of
gasoline taxes); cf. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) (holding that the federal
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”) provision prohibiting state
authorization of sports gambling violates the anti-commandeering doctrine because the
PASPA provision dictates what a state legislature may and may not do).
299 See Press Release, Hank Johnson, Rep. Johnson Introduces Bipartisan Mobile
Workforce State Income Tax Simplification Act of 2020 (Jan. 24, 2020),
https://hankjohnson.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/rep-johnson-introducesbipartisan-mobile-workforce-state-income-tax-0 [https://perma.cc/9BKK-GZWS]
(indicating that the bipartisan Mobile Workforce State Income Tax Simplification Act
was reintroduced in 2020 aiming to simplify the tax system).
300 Cf. Multi-State Worker Tax Fairness Act of 2020, H.R. 7968, 116th Cong. (2020)
(limiting the source taxation only to days when nonresident taxpayers are physically
present in the source state, but without containing a minimum day threshold).
301 Remote and Mobile Worker Relief Act of 2021, S. 1274, 117th Cong. (2021).
302 Senate Introduces Modified Mobile Worker Relief Bill to Protect Workers
Temporarily Working in States Due to COVID-19, ERNST & YOUNG (June 19, 2020),
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include a thirty day trigger before states are permitted to impose income
taxes, extending to ninety days during 2020 and 2021.303 Additionally,
employers would treat their workers’ income as earned at its normal
work location in 2020 and 2021.304
This Article does not fully support the Senate proposal because it
presupposes the pre-pandemic work arrangements when determining
the source of teleworkers’ incomes. Nonetheless, this Article welcomes
the concept of a federal solution, even if temporary. Despite the recent
proposal, negotiations on virus relief have experienced a deadlock in
Congress, and it is not apparent whether the challenge of taxing
teleworkers will advance on its own. Further, state tax officials oppose
the idea of the federal government interfering with their policies and
regulations, arguing that a state is free to pursue its own fiscal
policies.305
This Article argues that to redress the income tax problems of
teleworkers, Congress is the ideal candidate rather than the judiciary or
the states. Congress’ decision should clarify to what extent source states
can tax income from nonresidents, not just during the pandemic but
also long-term. For the reasons discussed above, this Article proposes a
residence-based taxation for individual taxpayers with a certain
threshold. Specifically, it supports the approach taken by the Mobile
Workforce State Income Tax Simplification Act that establishes a
uniform threshold where workers could be required to file and
businesses to withhold tax only after an employee has worked more
than thirty days in a state.306
Such a congressional uniform solution may offer the following
benefits. First, it provides a bright-line rule applicable nationally
resulting in increased compliance, where tax complexity can reduce
taxpayer compliance. Currently, taxpayers are perplexed by a bevy of
conflicting state rules and a lack of guidance. This burdens an
individual’s ability to pay taxes which in turn reduces both compliance
and revenues.

https://taxnews.ey.com/news/2020-1619-senate-introduces-modified-mobile-workerrelief-bill-to-protect-workers-temporarily-working-in-states-due-to-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/N3T4-89W4].
303 Id.
304 S. 1274, §§ 3(a)(1), (c)(5).
305 State of Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
306 Cf. Zelinsky, Current Status, supra note 159, at 6 (supporting residence-based
taxation of remote workers’ income, but going farther than the author’s proposal by
preventing source-based taxation even if the workers commute to the source state).
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Second, establishing a clear approach to taxation reduces the
country’s reliance on judicial intervention. Current tax cases are
complicated and require significant analysis in constitutional gray areas
searching out potential violations of the Dormant Commerce Clause or
Due Process Clause. States passing tax laws are subject to expensive and
lengthy adjudication, reducing the very purpose of the tax — to raise
revenues.
Currently, there are various state tax laws preventing these goals. The
goal of federal law would then not only be the standardization of tax
law and administration regarding virtual teleworkers, but it also would
focus on preempting state law that is an obstacle to these goals.
In the absence of federal legislation, the alternative solution would be
to allow all fifty states to adopt supporting tax laws individually. This
alternative is less preferable because many states are not incentivized to
apply a rule that would reduce their tax revenue (such as New York)
while at the same time, it would be less efficient and lack consistency
making it more difficult for individual taxpayers to comply.
B. Federal Preemption and the States Powers to Tax
Each state is sovereign and has the ability to establish its own method
and procedure for tax administration.307 This power has been termed as
“unlimited,” but only “so far as it has been surrendered to the Federal
government, either expressly or by necessary implication.”308 In other
words, “[f]ederal law may preempt state law under the Supremacy
Clause309 of the Constitution.”310
Next, the question is whether congressional legislation preempting
state tax law would be valid and enforceable in the context of the
taxation of teleworkers. The answer is yes.
When discussing preemption, the “presumption” when interpreting
a federal law is that “Congress does not intend to supplant state law.”311
This presumption may be overcome in three ways. First, state law can
307 See Arkansas v. Farm Credit Servs. of Cent. Ark., 520 U.S. 821, 826 (1997)
(noting that “[t]he power to tax is basic to the power of the States to exist”).
308 Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Peniston, 85 U.S. 5, 29 (1873).
309 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2. (reading “[t]his Constitution, and the laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
land”).
310 United States v. 4,432 Mastercases of Cigarettes, More or Less, 448 F.3d 1168,
1189 (2006).
311 N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645, 654 (1995).
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be preempted by conflict preemption when Congress “explicitly”
preempts state law “through explicit statutory language.”312 Second is
field preemption which is when the federal government “regulates
conduct in a field” so “pervasive[ly]” that courts will assume “Congress
left no room for the States to supplement it.”313 Field preemption is
applied when a state enacts a law in an area the federal government has
traditionally managed, such as immigration314 or foreign relations.315
Last, conflict preemption preempts state law when it “conflicts with
federal law.”316 Conflict preemption can happen either when “it is
impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal
requirements” or when the “state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.”317
In the context of taxing teleworkers, because tax law is an area that
has traditionally been dominated concurrently both by state and federal
governments, it seems likely that field preemption is unavailable.
Therefore, Congress’ best path to preempt state tax law and doctrine is
either by express preemption or conflict preemption supported via the
Supremacy Clause and Commerce Clause.318
Some scholarship argues that there should be significant limits on the
federal government’s power to preempt state tax law.319 Opponents of
the federal preemption of state tax law point to Alexander Hamilton’s
statement in the Federalist Papers that a state’s power to tax should
“retain an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise revenue to
any extent of which they may need, by every kind of taxation, except
duties on imports and exports.”320 The scope of those limitations

312

English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990).
Id. at 79.
314 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 403 (2012).
315 Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929) (noting how the “treaty-making
power is independent of and superior to the legislative power of the states . . . and when
[conflict is] ascertained [the federal law] must prevail over inconsistent state
enactments”).
316 English, 496 U.S. at 79.
317 Id. (citations omitted).
318 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (providing Congress may “regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with Indian Tribes”).
319 See Michael T. Fatale, Common Sense: Implicit Constitutional Limitations on
Congressional Preemptions of State Tax, 2012 MICH. STATE L. REV. 41, 43-45 (2012).
320 Id. at 44. (quoting ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 173 (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)).
313
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remains uncertain, but one school of thought is that the preemption of
any non-discriminatory state tax laws would be unconstitutional.321
Despite some scholars’ argument that state tax law may be uniquely
resistant to the federal government’s preemption power, this Article
argues that the federal government retains the power to preempt state
tax law by standardizing the taxation of teleworkers.322 In discussing
why Congress likely can preempt state tax law for teleworking, four
issues that are helpful to discuss briefly. First, the foundational
constitutional framework that allows the federal government to
preempt state tax law. Second, an overview of the various constitutional
powers Congress has relied on to preempt state tax law. Third, the
federal government’s history of preempting many different forms of
state tax laws. Last, and most persuasively, the Supreme Court’s recent
case law on this question directly invites Congress to legislate on this
specific question.
First, M’Culloch v. Maryland firmly establishes that federal law may
preempt state tax law.323 In holding that Maryland’s tax law was
preempted, the Supreme Court noted that “the states have no power, by
taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner
control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by congress
into execution the powers vested in the general government.”324 In
doing so, the M’Culloch court recognized that the states’ “absolute”
power to tax remains “subordinate to, and may be controlled by the
constitution of the United States.”325
Second, federal law will preempt state law “in any area” where
Congress has authority.326 In practice, this often happens in areas where
both the federal and state governments operate, such as tax law.327 Some
examples of the types of constitutional authority that has been used to
preempt state tax law include (1) the federal government’s power to
321 Id. at 72-73 (discussing how Congress had not preempted a non-discriminatory
tax and arguing that the Commerce Clause would not do so).
322 E.g., David Gamage & Darien Shanske, The Federal Government’s Power to Restrict
State Taxation, 81 STATE TAX NOTES 547, 551 (2016) (giving the examples of ERISA and
certain provisions within the Affordable Care Act).
323 See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 435 (1819) (holding that Maryland’s tax
on a federal bank located in Maryland was unconstitutional despite both federal and
state governments having “concurrent” power to tax).
324 Id. at 436.
325 Id. at 427.
326 When
Does Federal Law Preempt State Law?, BONALAW PC,
https://www.businessjustice.com/when-does-federal-law-preempt-state-law.html (last
visited Jan. 27, 2021) [https://perma.cc/XK8T-NJVR].
327 Id.
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regulate Native American reservations,328 (2) Congress’s power to
interact with other foreign powers,329 (3) federal law that requires a
state to not apply discriminatory taxes against another state’s residents
or against federal employees,330 and (4) most importantly, through
Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce.331 Because this
Article focuses on the multistate taxation of teleworkers working for
out-of-state employers, the Dormant Commerce Clause seems to be the
most effective tool to preempt state tax doctrines.
Third, historically, the federal government has had the freedom to
preempt most forms of state tax laws.332 Influential portions of the legal
community support the premise that federal law likely only “lacks the
power to abolish state-level corporate income taxes,” but otherwise can
preempt almost all other forms of state tax law, examples including the
“retirement income of nonresidents, internet access, or interstate
businesses with limited nexus.”333
Last but not least, the Supreme Court has repeatedly conceded that
Congress may step in and regulate state tax law when it relates to
interstate commerce. In South Dakota v. Wayfair, where the Court
discussed the intersection of the Dormant Commerce Clause and tax
law, the majority “conceded that Congress has the authority to change
the physical presence rule.”334 Importantly, not only has the Supreme
Court expressly noted that Congress has the ability to standardize the
rules of state tax and the physical presence of taxpayers, but the Court
has also consistently upheld federal law that preempts state tax law
which burdens interstate commerce.335
For the foregoing reasons, federal law allows the preemption of state
tax law that stands as an obstacle to the enforcement of residence-based
taxation for teleworkers’ multistate income. This seems likely to be the
case in light of the Supreme Court’s express endorsement for Congress
328 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Stranburg, 799 F.3d 1324, 1335 (11th Cir. 2015)
(stating that the federal regulations that govern “the leasing of Indian land-including a
regulation that prohibits rental taxes” preempt the state’s rental tax).
329 See Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929).
330 See Davis v. Mich. Dep’t. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 817-18 (1989); Ariz. Pub.
Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141, 148 (1979).
331 See Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 184 (1983).
332 See Gamage & Shanske, supra note 322, at 551-52.
333 Id. at 547.
334 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2096 (2018).
335 See, e.g., Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Dir. of Tax’n of Haw., 464 U.S. 7, 9, 11, 12 (1983)
(invalidating a Hawaii state tax on gross receipts of airlines because a federal statute
preempted gross receipts of taxes on the sale of air transportation or travel in air
commerce).
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to legislate in this area, legal scholarship’s support for the federal
preemption of state tax laws, and because of the long history of the
federal preemption of state tax laws under the Dormant Commerce
Clause as well as through other various congressional powers. Though
the power of the federal preemption of state tax law is not limitless,
federal preemption in this area would succeed under a Dormant
Commerce Clause analysis as a burden on interstate commerce.
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the risk of double taxation arises when one
state taxes an individual based on resident status and another taxes this
same individual based on their source of income. The ideal solution is
to adopt a uniform measure to relieve double taxation. However, the
lack of uniformity among the states is allowing some states to exercise
aggressive source-based taxation on remote workers.
This problem has been exacerbated in the wake of COVID-19, where
the majority of Americans now work remotely. Many states have issued
either no guidance for the taxation of teleworkers’ state income tax or
have only issued temporary guidance maintaining the pre-pandemic
situation as the status quo. The interim guidance in effect intrusively
extends source-based taxation at the cost of residence taxation. This
raises concerns under the Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause,
which in turn emphasizes that a state cannot place an undue burden on
interstate commerce by taxing out of state residents at a higher rate than
in state residents.
Congress should act by establishing laws that govern the states’ ability
to tax cross-border activities. Specifically, Congress should enact a longterm solution where a source state may only tax a nonresident’s income
on the days where the taxpayer is physically present for a certain
number of days (for example, thirty days). This proposal can act as a
threshold to trigger the compliance obligation and provide that
teleworking does not count as physical presence in the source state.
Besides Congressional action, the Supreme Court should have heard
New Hampshire and decided that extraterritorial source taxation over
nonresident teleworkers by maintaining the pre-pandemic work
arrangement, because the status quo violates both the Commerce
Clause and Due Process Clause. This would have promoted greater
efficiency among the states and signaled Congress that they should act
to create clearer guidance for the multistate taxation of teleworkers.
Both employers and employees will welcome a judicial or
congressional solution for taxing teleworkers. Obviously, employers
will expect clear guidance on how to process employees’ individual tax
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documents. However, there is another reason why many businesses pay
close attention to teleworkers’ individual tax problems. When a
business has cross-border employees stranded in different taxing
jurisdictions, this may trigger tax nexus for the business in each
jurisdiction where a certain number of employees are located. And with
a tax nexus, these different states may attempt to assess corporate
income taxes on the business.336 The potential tax competition on such
businesses is a hidden million-dollar question behind taxing
teleworkers. That question is beyond the scope of this Article, but will
be explored in the author’s future projects.

336

See Bologna, supra note 19.

